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The Rise of Risk in International Law
Stephen Townley

Abstract
Risk analysis—a coping mechanism for the uncertainties we see everywhere around us—
is on the rise, including at the international level. It now informs, for instance, the work of the
Security Council and human rights law and practice. While the story of how risk analysis has
inflected international environmental law is frequently told, there has been little attention paid to
the way in which risk is increasingly relevant to other areas of international law, including through
“due diligence” standards. This Article fills this gap, describing risk’s propagation across different
international legal fields. It also offers a taxonomy of the ways in which risk is relevant. This
Article distinguishes, for instance, between the way risk sometimes authorizes the state to take
an action and situations where the existence of risk obligates the state to react. Finally, this
Article seeks to explain potential reasons for risk’s rise and indicate some of the consequences
thereof, both salutary (such as greater participation in international legal decision-making) and
less so (such as greater horizontal fragmentation of international law).
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Risk has become a preoccupation of states,1 businesses,2 and individuals.3
What once was the subject of a Tom Cruise science fiction film4 is now before the
U.S. Supreme Court.5 There is even an emergent theory of “proactive law” that
seeks broadly to “shift[ ] the focus of attention from dispute-resolution to . . . legal
risk management.”6 In the U.N. Security Council, we may be seeing a third
generation of sanctions—not sanctions that apply with a broad brush to entire
states, nor even measures that apply to designated individuals, entities or items,
but sanctions triggered when a state believes that an individual, entity or item
poses a particular risk; a similar point can be made with respect to U.N.
peacekeeping missions, which are increasingly authorized to protect civilians at
risk. More broadly, at the U.N., the new Secretary-General, in his first briefing of
the Security Council, stressed the critical role of prevention,7 which, in turn,
requires a framework for assessing the risk of conflict or atrocities occurring.8
1

2

3

4
5

6

7

8

JACQUELINE PEEL, SCIENCE AND RISK REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (2010)
(“Risk . . . has become a central concern of advanced regulatory states over the last few decades.”);
see generally Monika Ambrus et al., Risk and International Law, in RISK AND THE REGULATION OF
UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 5 (Monika Ambrus et al. eds., 2017) (discussing the
“dialectical relation between law and uncertainty”); ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW
MODERNITY (1992).
See, for example, Susannah Snider, Explore Five Hot Jobs for MBA Graduates, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/KUL2-J7SN (opining that “an increasingly complicated, always-changing
regulatory environment continues to boost demand for compliance officers”).
This includes everything from health risks, see, for example, Gretchen Reynolds, Should a Simple Fitness
Check
Be
Part
of
Your
Checkup?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
30,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/well/move/should-a-simple-fitness-check-be-part-ofyour-checkup.html, to the risk of being attacked by terrorists, see, for example, Paul Sullivan, Taking
a Rational Look at the Risk of Threats, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/your-money/taking-a-rational-look-at-the-risk-ofthreats.html.
MINORITY REPORT (Dreamworks Pictures 2002).
Cf. Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programssecret-algorithms.html (discussing Supreme Court review of a case where at sentencing the judge
considered a statistical report that purported to show that the defendant posed “a high risk of
violence, high risk of recidivism, high pretrial risk”).
Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Paul Shrivastava, Beyond Compliance: Sustainable Development, Business, and
Proactive Law, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 417, 438 (2015); see also George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Using
Proactive Law for Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641, 656–67 (2010).
U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Security Council Open Debate on
‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention and Sustaining Peace’ (Jan.
10, 2017), https://perma.cc/24ER-9GF9 (discussing early warning).
Cf. generally UNITED NATIONS, FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS FOR ATROCITY CRIMES: A TOOL FOR
PREVENTION (2014), https://perma.cc/9VM2-8UB4.
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Risk, of course, can mean different things in different contexts. In this
Article, I use “risk” in two specific ways: what might be termed “known” and
“unknown” risk, or “risk” and “uncertainty.”9 “Known” risk is the probability of
occurrence of an event coupled with the magnitude of the resulting harm. 10
“Known” risk thus entails a certain measurability. Examples might be the risk
presented by Russian roulette, where there is a known one-in-six chance of
death,11 or the risk of car crashes entailed by particular highway driving conditions,
which insurance companies have been able to assess based on statistical analyses. 12
“Unknown” risk is more inchoate potential peril about which we lack information
either on the likelihood of the harm materializing or knowledge of the effect it
would have if it did. An example might be the potential effect of introduction of
an invasive species into a new ecosystem.13 Of course, this division into categories
is something of an oversimplification, since risk operates along a quantifiability
continuum.14 I also count “threats” as a form of “known” risk. Threats—at least
as that term is used in this Article—are risks that tend to be assessed on an
individual, qualitative basis rather than as a statistical measure. An example might
be the threat that a particular individual will commit a terrorist attack.15
Risk is distinct from, and antecedent to, harm. That is, the existence of risk
may permit or require a state to act before harm has occurred. For instance, those
who support the legal availability of anticipatory self-defense argue that a state
9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Cf. Jose Luis Bermudez & Michael S. Pardo, Risk, Uncertainty, and ‘Super Risk’, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 471, 473 (2015) (“Decisions under risk involve circumstances in which the
probabilities and costs associated with possible outcomes can be quantified; whereas decisions
under uncertainty involve circumstances in which the probabilities and costs associated with
possible outcomes are not amenable to quantification.”).
See Arie Trouwborst, Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law: The Relationship Between the Precautionary
Principle and the Preventative Principle in International Law and Associated Questions, 2 ERASMUS L. REV.
105, 117 (2009). Cf. Glossary, in UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 215–16 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996) (defining risk).
See NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL
RULES 74–75 (2002).
See René Ureña, Risk and Randomness in International Legal Argumentation, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 787,
790–91 (2008).
See Rosie Cooney & Andrew T.F. Lang, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Adaptive Governance and
International Trade, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 525 (2007).
Both “known” and “unknown” risk are, however, different from risk in the sense of individualized
reasonable suspicion, which I exclude. Reasonable suspicion—and similar such standards—does
not turn on the likelihood of a hazard materializing, but rather on whether there is sufficient
information to deem that a hazard has materialized (even if it later turns out that it has not).
While Professor Nicholas Tsagourias has suggested conceptual differences between risk and threat,
he acknowledges that the two are merging in some contexts. See Nicholas Tsagourias, Risk and the
Use of Force, in RISK AND THE REGULATION OF UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
1, at 13, 15.
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may use force even before an armed attack has occurred where the attack is
believed to be imminent.16 Likewise, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS) have recently asserted that states have an obligation to conduct
environmental impact assessments (EIAs)17 where there is sufficient risk of
environmental harm, but before the relevant action has been taken.
Risk in these senses is taking off at the international level, and not just at the
U.N. In particular, the last few years have been characterized by ever greater
expansion of the field of application of prevention rules—rules requiring efforts
to prevent harm, often by seeking to mitigate “known risks of harm”18—and due
diligence obligations, or “best efforts” obligations of conduct.19 Prevention and
due diligence are related, as due diligence is generally the relevant standard of
conduct for the implementation of prevention rules.20 That is, even if a state has
an obligation to prevent harm when a certain quantum of risk of that harm
materializing exists, the obligation is seldom absolute. Rather, it more frequently
takes the form of an obligation to take measures to mitigate the risk of the harm
materializing. That prevention rules and due diligence obligations have risen to

16

Compare Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of the UN Charter Regime,
24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151, 157 (2013) (explaining that those who reject “anticipatory self-defense”
believe that the “legality of resort to force . . . should operate as an on-off switch, flipped by the
manifestation of readily identifiable factual preconditions”), with id. at 158 (explaining that those
who support anticipatory self-defense prefer something more akin to a balancing test, one that
would include the probability of an anticipated attack materializing and the consequences thereof—
in other words, a risk assessment). See also Noam Lubell, The Problem of Imminence in an Uncertain
World, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1, 18–21
(Marc Weller ed., 2014). In a widely-cited paper regarding self-defense against non-state actors,
former U.K. Legal Adviser Daniel Bethlehem included “the probability of an attack” among the
relevant factors that might justify anticipatory action. Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope
of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Act by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J.
INT’L L. 1, 6 (2012); see also Brian Egan, International Law, Legal Diplomacy and the Counter-ISIL
Campaign, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. OFF. LEGAL ADVISER (Apr. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/E5D4-295Q.

17

See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 113, ¶ 204 (Apr. 20)
[hereinafter Pulp Mills]; Certain Activities Carried Out By Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica
v. Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica),
Judgments, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665, ¶ 104 (Dec. 16) [hereinafter Costa Rica v. Nicar.]; Responsibilities
and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area
(Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), Case No. 17, Advisory
Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 11 ITLOS Rep. 10, ¶ 145 (Seabed Disputes Chamber).
Trouwborst, Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law, supra note 10, at 117.

18
19

Timo Koivurova, Due Diligence, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
(2010), https://perma.cc/BP2E-A9TM.

20

See id. at ¶ 2 (describing due diligence as focusing on “preventive measures expected of a State”).
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prominence at the same time is thus no surprise.21 These concepts are now being
applied broadly, including to business activities,22 cyberspace,23 and assistance to
21

The precautionary approach, see, for example, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development,
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I
(Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration], is also ever more salient (or at least ever more
discussed), although I count that as a form of prevention applicable under conditions of uncertainty.
See ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2002) [hereinafter EVOLUTION AND STATUS]; JACQUELINE PEEL, THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE: ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING AND SCIENTIFIC
UNCERTAINTY 64 (2005). As Professor Arie Trouwborst has succinctly put it, “[i]f the
environmental effects of a particular activity are known, measures to avoid them may be termed
preventative. If such effects are uncertain, the same measures may also be labelled precautionary.”
Trouwborst, Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law, supra note 10, at 116. The lack of clarity regarding
the precise contours of the precautionary approach, and its principal role (at least in my view) as a
decision-making tool rather than an obligation or authorization, makes it however only an ancillary
focus of this Article. Where I do address it, I use the terms “precaution” or “precautionary
approach” rather than the term “precautionary principle,” although I mean what is often described
in the literature as the latter. Cf. Jacqueline Peel, Precaution—A Matter of Principle, Approach or Process?,
5 MELB. J. INTL L. 483, 485 (2004).

22

See, for example, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Respect, Protect and Remedy’
Framework at 18–22, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles] (asserting
the need for human rights due diligence and measures to mitigate risk). I recognize that businesses
are not subjects of international law. That said, given the prominence of the U.N. Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights, I include discussion of how those Principles are being understood
and implemented. Cf. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422 (2000) (discussing the salience of certain non-binding
commitments).
See, for example, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE
27 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013); Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125
YALE L.J. FORUM 68, 70 (2015) (“[E]xperts unanimously agreed that states shoulder a due diligence
obligation with respect to both government and private cyber infrastructure on, and cyber activities
emanating from, their territory.”); David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L
SEC. L. & POL’Y 87, 93–94 (2010); Karine Bannelier-Christakis, Cyber Diligence: A Low-Intensity Due
Diligence Principle for Low-Intensity Cyber Operations?, 14 BALTIC Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2014) (“Does due
diligence imply an obligation for States to monitor cyber activities on their territory? The answer to
this question is positive because, as it will be seen later, due diligence implies not only an obligation
to react but also to prevent. Vigilance and monitoring thus go hand in hand.”); Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey,
Note, Hacking Into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age
of Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1445 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he international community
could adopt such a test to govern cyber warfare: the neutral state could satisfy its duty under IHL
as long as it had applied the means at its disposal to detect and repel a belligerent’s incursions”);
Beatrice A. Walton, Note, Duties Owed: Low-Intensity Cyber Attacks and Liability for Transboundary Torts
in International Law, 126 YALE L. J. 1460, 1502 (2017) (“[W]here attribution to a state is impossible,
but attribution to private entities operating within a state’s territory or via infrastructure located in
a state is possible, an attack should only give rise to liability if the state failed to act diligently in
preventing it. That is, the applicable standard of care imposed upon states in these cases should be
due diligence.”); Katharina Ziolkowski, General Principles of International Law as Applicable in Cyberspace,
in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE 135, 135, 169 (Katharina Ziolkowsi,
ed., 2013) [hereinafter PEACETIME REGIME]; Daniel Ortner, Comment, Cybercrime and Punishment:

23
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states and armed groups during armed conflict.24 Legal regimes predicated upon
threats, too, are gaining increasing significance in international law, and not just
the question of self-defense. Thus, for instance, the Security Council has begun to
require states to take measures to halt the proliferation threat that certain items or
transactions may pose.25
While there is robust literature on the role of risk in various areas of domestic
26
law, and while certain risk-related international law topics such as prevention27
(and the precautionary approach) have been considered exhaustively, scholarship
on those topics has generally remained within topical silos. Prevention, for
instance, has principally been discussed in the context of international
environmental law.28
Other aspects of risk, such as due diligence, not only suffer from a deficit of
cross-cutting analysis, but are also under-studied.29 Risk also remains under-

24

25

26

The Russian Mafia and Russian Responsibility To Exercise Due Diligence To Prevent Trans-Boundary
Cybercrime, 2015 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 177, 208 (2015) (“[T]he government should independently seek to
measure and evaluate its progress by conducting impact assessments.”); see also Benedikt Pirker,
Territorial Sovereignty and Integrity and the Challenges of Cyberspace, in PEACETIME REGIME, supra, at 189,
208 (asserting that there “may be a certain minimum standard of control over cyber activities that
needs to be respected”). Cf. Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in Cyberspace: An
Emerging Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 43, 47, 56 (2009)
(discussing a neutral state’s obligation of due diligence and what a belligerent might do if the neutral
state fails to take action).
See, for example, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST
GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE
WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 150 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter ICRC
REVISED COMMENTARY] (advancing a new interpretation of Common Article 1 that states have “a
general duty of due diligence to prevent and repress breaches of the Conventions by private persons
over which a State exercises authority . . . This is an obligation of means, whose content depends
on the specific circumstances, in particular the foreseeability of the violations and the State’s
knowledge thereof, the gravity of the breach, the means reasonably available to the State and the
degree of influence it exercises over the private persons.”).
See, for example, S.C. Res. 2094, ¶¶ 11, 15 (Mar. 7, 2013) (requiring states to “prevent the provision
of financial services . . . that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile
programmes” and not to provide financial support for trade with the DPRK “where such financial
support could contribute” to the DPRK’s prohibited programmes or activities); S.C. Res. 2270, ¶¶
8, 17, 27, 35, 36 (Mar. 2, 2016); S.C. Res. 1929, ¶ 13 (June 9, 2010).
Compare CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005), with
Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1071 (2006) (book review).

27

In this Article, I use the terms “prevention,” “preventive principle” and “preventative principle”
interchangeably.

28

For instance, an interesting recent volume on risk in international law addresses a number of topics
separately. See Ambrus et al., supra note 1.

29

See Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 YALE L.J.F. 68 (2015). Perhaps
the most robust study of due diligence was that conducted by the International Law Association,
which formed a study group on the subject that produced two thorough reports: Study Group on Due
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theorized in the sense that there has been little analysis of the variety of roles risk
can play in legal regimes. By “role” I mean the effect the existence of the risk has
on state conduct. For instance, risk could be either obligating or authorizing. The
Security Council sanctions regimes I have briefly described above are examples of
“risk as obligation”: that is, if there is sufficient risk, the state is obligated to freeze
the assets or stop the transaction. On the other hand, with respect to anticipatory
self-defense, risk (or threat) provides a legal authorization for a state to use force.30
What a state is obligated or authorized to do may also vary. Thus, for instance, a
prevention obligation might require a state to undertake an environmental impact
assessment. This would be a procedural obligation (like an obligation to negotiate
or cooperate in good faith), in the sense that it does not speak to the ultimate
legality of the proposed activity. By contrast, anticipatory self-defense is a
substantive authorization, in that it renders the actual use of force lawful, subject to
necessity and proportionality.31 Finally, risk can be judged on a case-by-case basis, or
specific activities can be categorized as more or less risky in advance—that is, risk
can be relevant either as applied (or contextually), or facially.32
Risk analysis can also be scoped more broadly or more narrowly—for
instance, is it the risk to one’s own citizens that matters, the risk to neighboring
states or their citizens, or the risk to all states or their citizens?33 Likewise, one

Diligence in International Law, 76 INT'L L. ASS'N REP. CONF. 947 (2014) [hereinafter ILA Study Group,
First Report]; and Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, 77 INT'L L. ASS'N REP. CONF. 1062
(2016) [hereinafter ILA Study Group, Second Report]. Joanna Kulesza’s recent monograph on due
diligence is a useful source regarding the ILC’s work, see JOANNA KULESZA, DUE DILIGENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016), and Monica Hakimi’s work on state responsibility for the acts of third
parties is an excellent and important contribution, see Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility,
21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341 (2010).
30

31

32

33

See note 14, supra. This is not to say that there is a stark dichotomy here. Sometimes, a breach of
an obligation to prevent a risk may give rise to an authorization on the part of another state to take
action. I do not wish to engage debates regarding the relationship between obligations and rights.
Rather, my claim is more descriptive—I classify risk as obligation or authorization based on where
the legal focus has tended to lie.
See generally Pulp Mills, supra note 17, for distinction between procedural and substantive obligations.
Cf. Stefan Talmon, Jus Cogens after Germany v. Italy: Substantive and Procedural Rules Distinguished, 25
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 979, 984 (2012) (distinguishing procedural obligations from “procedural rules,”
which do not address the lawfulness of the conduct at issue).
Two examples are the placement of species on lists, such as Appendix II of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species, Appendix II art. (2)(a), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087
[hereinafter CITES], and the identification of specific wastes by the Bamako Convention on the
Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of
Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, art. 2, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773.
Cf. Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, AC v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1233
(D. Nev. 2006) (“Nothing in NEPA’s language suggests Congress intended NEPA to apply outside
United States territory.”), vacated 482 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2007).
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could take account of more or fewer sources of risk. For instance, under what
circumstances should risk presented by purely private conduct be relevant?
International law has increasingly begun to put these myriad forms of risk to
use. As one commentator put it, prevention has “resurfac[ed] spectacularly.”34
Likewise, while due diligence has a deep pedigree, it was not until the late 1980s
and early 1990s that it began to be applied more broadly, in particular through
human rights instruments and jurisprudence regarding violence against women.35
On one level, a turn to risk analysis should not be surprising given the
attractiveness of prevention over response in situations where the consequences
of wrongful or injurious conduct are increasingly grave (or at least where our
collective tolerance for such consequences continues to diminish). Moreover, it is
a truism that the world is only growing more interdependent, and thus it makes
sense that techniques developed in the context of transboundary environmental
disputes are now being applied more broadly.36 On a deeper level, however, while
under domestic law risk analysis can sometimes be seen as anti-democratic
(insofar as it may rely on experts rather than popular will),37 at the international
level, it may actually be a way to appeal to and involve an audience beyond other
states. That is, if international law claims are increasingly directed not just to other
states, but also to civil society and individual citizens, risk (and the empirical
approach it can bring with it) may be an attractive tool. The turn to risk may also
be of a piece with the growth of a “global administrative space.”38
34

35

36
37
38

Ilias Plakokefalos, Prevention Obligations in International Environmental Law, 2 (Amsterdam Ctr. for Int’l.
L., Working Paper No. 2013-12, 2013), https://perma.cc/4N2D-FP99; see also Costa Rica v. Nicar.,
supra note 17, at 23, ¶¶ 4, 53–57 (separate opinion by Cançado Trindade, J.) (discussing
developments that “bring to the fore the relevance of the preventive dimension in contemporary
international law”). While precaution is also much discussed, its current status is somewhat
uncertain. Cf. Alexander Gillespie, The Precautionary Principle in the Twenty-First Century: A Case Study
of Noise Pollution in the Ocean, 22 INT’L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 61, 70 (2007) (“[O]utside of the
explicit adoption of the [precautionary] principle in some international texts, it has no general
application.”); Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶
123, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (“The precautionary principle is regarded by
some as having crystallized into a general principle of customary international environmental law.
Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary international
law appears less than clear.”) (emphasis added).
See, for example, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, ¶ 24(a), U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1993) (“States
parties should take appropriate and effective measures to overcome all forms of gender-based
violence, whether by public or private act.”) (emphasis added); Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, art. 7(b), June 9, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1534 (“[A]pply due diligence . . . .”).
See, for example, Tsagourias, supra note 15, at 13.
See Ureña, supra note 12, at 817 (citing sources).
Cf. Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law
in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 1, 1 (2006) (describing the global administrative
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This Article seeks to unpack the rise of risk at the international level and
make three contributions. First, it uses illustrative episodes, particularly from the
history of prevention (and, to a limited extent, precaution39) and due diligence, to
sketch the story of this rise. It strives to go beyond the usual account, to look
across disciplines, and to apply a more rigorous taxonomy to the roles risk has
played. Second, it posits and seeks to illuminate a recent trend in favor of
increasing use of risk in international law.
Third, and finally, the Article offers tentative explanations for this trend and
thoughts on the potential consequences thereof. For example, one such
consequence is that international courts and tribunals may not be well suited to
reviewing risk analysis (or the decisions that flow from such analysis). A second
consequence might be the potential for horizontal fragmentation (that is, the
potential for differences of understanding of international law among states as
they reach different conclusions about the risks presented by particular activities
and hence the potential that state practice and opinio juris will begin to diverge,
creating different “international laws”).
The Article proceeds in six parts. In Part II, I set the stage by describing the
U.N. Security Council’s increasing use of risk-based approaches. In Part III, I go
back in time to explain how we got to where we are today, focusing in particular
on the development of the prevention and due diligence doctrines. In Section IV,
I identify the broad range of areas and issues that are now addressed through the
prism of risk, and use the taxonomy I have sketched above to describe them. In
Part V, I offer potential reasons for why the use of risk may be increasing (and
the consequences thereof), and in Part VI, I provide a brief conclusion.

II. T HE U.N. S ECUR ITY C OUNCIL AND R ISK
In this Part, I describe recent Security Council practice to give some sense
of how prevalent risk-based approaches have become. The Security Council
increasingly functions as a legislative or administrative body; at the same time,
treaty-making has declined, making Council practice a useful lens for
space as one where “administrative functions are performed in often complex interplays between
officials and institutions on different levels,” including the international level). On global
governance generally, see the useful repository of papers at N.Y.U.’s Institute for International Law
and Justice, www.iilj.org [https://perma.cc/Y2SW-82X4].
39

Precaution, or the “precautionary approach,” is a term that is notoriously difficult to define. Many,
however, cite the Rio Declaration as setting it forth in classical form. That declaration, in its
Principle 15, states that “[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” Rio Declaration, supra note 21. See generally
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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understanding risk analysis.40 I focus on two areas of Council practice in particular:
sanctions and the related area of suppression of terrorist financing, and the
protection of civilians. An analysis of these two areas shows how the Council is
using risk in myriad ways: as obligation and as authorization, as process and as
substance, and as a tool to be applied broadly or narrowly depending on the
situation.

A. Sanctions
In this Section, I turn first to the ways in which the Security Council has
made sanctions regimes more risk-based. The Security Council has traditionally
used two principal tools in the sanctions space: (1) arms embargoes or other
restrictions on transactions with or destined to a particular state; and (2) asset
freezes or travel bans on identified individuals or entities.41 There are hybrid
forms, such as the arms embargoes on particular individuals in Yemen 42 and on
individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda,43 but, at the risk of overgeneralization, the former principally speaks to what is being transferred whereas
the latter concerns with whom one is dealing. Moreover, the “what” and the “who”
have tended to be predicated upon past conduct or an assessment of the current
state of affairs.44 The basis for imposing sanctions has not tended to be the likely
future effect of a particular transaction or a person’s probable future conduct.45

40

See Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175, 175 (2005) (“As
has recently been noted, the Security Council has entered its legislative phase.”).

41

These individuals or entities are commonly identified in an annex adopted as part of a Security
Council resolution or in specific listing proposals that are then agreed upon by all Council members
operating in the format of a Security Council sanctions committee.
S.C. Res. 2216, ¶ 14 (Apr. 14, 2015).

42
43
44

45

S.C. Res. 2253, ¶ 2(c) (Dec. 17, 2015).
We have begun to see self-judging assessments of whether individuals or entities should be subject
to asset freezes or travel bans (in the sense that the freeze or the ban would apply to individuals or
entities a state believes has engaged in sanctionable conduct, rather than to individuals or entities
that have been identified by the Council). For instance, Resolution 2270 applied the DPRK asset
freeze to entities a particular state deems associated with the DPRK WMD or missile programs.
S.C. Res. 2270, supra note 25, at ¶ 32. And in Resolution 2178, the Council applied a travel ban to
those about whom a state has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe he
or she is seeking to enter their territory for the purpose of committing terrorist acts. S.C. Res. 2178,
¶ 8 (Sep. 23, 2014). Although these are important and novel developments in their own right, such
approaches are not risk-based in the sense used by this Article insofar as they turn on a state’s
understanding of the present state of affairs (that is, turning on questions such as whether a person
is associated with a weapons program and what a person’s current intention may be), rather than a
prediction regarding the future.
At a more general level, of course, sanctions are meant to be preventative.
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That recently changed.46 Thus, for instance, the first sanctions resolution on
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), Resolution
1718,47 took a relatively traditional approach, banning the export of certain
identified items to the DPRK. But the next resolution, Resolution 1874, contained
a provision calling upon states to prevent their nationals or entities organized
under their laws from providing financial services that “could contribute” to the
DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or missile programs.48 This was
risk-based (most akin to a threat analysis), albeit hortatory. Only those services
each state itself believed posed a sufficient risk of contributing to the DPRK’s
prohibited activities triggered the provision. Resolution 2094 went even further
by making this provision binding.49
The next DPRK sanctions resolution, Resolution 2270, added a new
formulation—obligations triggered by a “determination” regarding whether items
or services could contribute to activities of concern.50 Thus, for instance, the
resolution prohibits the sale or supply of “any item, except food or medicine, if
the State determines that such item could directly contribute to the development
of the DPRK’s operational capabilities of its armed forces.”51
46

There are some historical precedents for a risk-based approach, such as a travel ban on those
“likely” to further or encourage Southern Rhodesian actions. See S.C. Res. 253, ¶ 5(b) (May 29,
1968). But, they are few and far between.

47

I do not here describe Resolution 1695, which was somewhat unusual in structure. S.C. Res. 1695
(Jul. 15, 2006).

48

S.C. Res. 1874, ¶ 18 (June 12, 2009); see also id. at ¶ 20 (applying the same standard to trade credits);
id. at ¶ 28 (applying the same standard for training).

49

S.C. Res. 2094, supra note 25, at ¶ 11. It also made binding an earlier non-binding provision
regarding trade credits. Id. at ¶ 15. It further included a number of hortatory provisions regarding
the prohibition of banking relationships, id. at ¶ 12, and the opening of representative offices, id. at
¶ 13, if the state had information that provided reasonable grounds to believe that these activities
could contribute to the DPRK’s prohibited activities. Unlike other ‘reasonable grounds’ type
provisions, these were risk-based in that the question was not whether there was sufficient
information to conclude that certain facts were true at the present, but whether there was a
sufficient predicate to make a probability (risk) assessment.

50

S.C. Res. 2270, supra note 25, at ¶ 8 (regarding items that could contribute to development of
operational capabilities of DPRK armed forces); id. at ¶ 27 (regarding items that could contribute
to WMD or missile programs). The resolution also requires states to close representative offices,
subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK if the state has credible information that provides
reasonable grounds to believe these financial services could contribute to the DPRK’s prohibited
activities. Id. at ¶ 35; see also id. at ¶ 17 (requiring states to prohibit training of DPRK nationals that
could contribute to proliferation sensitive activities); id. at ¶ 36 (prohibiting public or private
financial support that could contribute to prohibited activities).

51

Id. at ¶ 8. There is an exception to this catch-all if the state further determines that the item would
be exclusively for livelihood purposes. Id. An even more recent resolution, Resolution 2321, picked
up on the precedent set by Resolution 2270 and provided for the imposition of certain measures
unless the State determines that there is no risk. S.C. Res. 2321, ¶ 11 (Nov. 30, 2016) (emphasis
added). That is, states are required to suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons
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Measures of this form are not limited to the DPRK context. For instance, in
Resolution 1929, the Council prohibited the transfer of items to Iran “if the State
determine[d] they could contribute” to enrichment52 and prohibited the provision
of financial services if the state had reasonable grounds to believe they could
contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.53
These resolutions not only are using risk, but using risk in different ways. A
prohibition on transactions that pose a sufficient risk of contributing to prohibited
programs relies on risk to impose a substantive obligation. Resolution 2270, on
the other hand, which speaks of determinations regarding the sale or supply of
certain items, is at least suggestive of a potential role for risk assessment
procedures.54
More broadly, the Security Council has increasingly imposed similar (albeit
less reticulated) prevention and due diligence obligations on states with respect to
terrorist financing. Thus, for instance, Resolution 1373 requires states to prevent
and suppress the financing of terrorist acts.55 Likewise, in the context of the Al
Qaeda/ISIL asset freeze, states are required to prevent their nationals, individuals,
and entities within their territory from making funds, financial assets, or economic
resources available to designated individuals or entities.56 As one commentator has
put it:
Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, states focused their compliance with the
Terrorism Suppression Conventions almost exclusively on criminal law
enforcement. . . . [I]ts application to terrorist offence is post facto and therefore
not strictly preventive. Following 9/11 with the adoption of Security Council
Resolution 1373 (2001) . . . states began to report on measures taken to
prevent terrorists from gaining access to funds or from using their territories
as a base of operations or indoctrination.57

sponsored by or representing the DPRK unless “the State engaging in scientific or technical
cooperation determines that the particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation
sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes.” Id. at ¶ 11(b) (emphasis added).
52
53
54

55
56

57

S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 25, at ¶ 13.
Id. at ¶ 21; see also id., at ¶¶ 23, 24.
The exact import of this provision is not entirely clear—it could mean that states must make
determinations (a procedural obligation) or the making of such a determination could trigger the
obligation to prohibit the transaction (a substantive obligation) or some combination thereof.
S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(a) (Sept. 28, 2001).
S.C. Res. 2253, supra note 43, at ¶ 2(a). The Security Council took a similar approach in Resolution
2178 on Foreign Terrorist Fighters, imposing not only a criminalization obligation, but also a
prevention obligation. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 44, at ¶ 5.
KIMBERLEY M. TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 76 (2011). There
are limited risk-based provisions in some of the terrorism conventions. See, for example, International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 18(1)(b), Dec. 9, 1999, G.A.
Res. 54/109, 39 I.L.M. 270.
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My argument in this Section is not that this trend in Security Council
sanctions practice means it has abandoned other tools. Of course, blunter
approaches remain in the Security Council’s arsenal. Thus, for instance,
Resolution 2371 prohibited all trade with the DPRK in certain sectors (including,
for instance, coal and iron). And, Resolution 2375 extended those prohibitions to
natural gas and textiles, and imposed a cap on the amount of refined petroleum
that could be sold to the DPRK. Indeed, as the crisis regarding the DPRK has
deepened, and in particular in light of the way in which all sectors of the DPRK
economy have some relationship to the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile
programs, risk-mitigation measures may be insufficient. Rather, my argument here
is that the Council has begun to use risk-based tools in its sanctions practice; and
the Council will surely use them again in addressing threats for which they are
appropriate.58

B. Protection of Civilians
In this Section, I turn next to a second area of recent Security Council
practice that has relied on risk assessments: protection of civilians mandates. In
general, unlike the sanctions regimes I described in the prior Section, pursuant to
which the Council imposed obligations on states where there was sufficient risk,
these examples are of authorizations to take action on the basis of risk.59
Historically, peacekeepers were expected to respond to outbreaks of
violence when they occurred. The Brahimi report, for instance, suggested
peacekeepers should be authorized to respond when they “witness violence
against civilians.”60 More recently, however, peacekeeping missions with
protection-of-civilians mandates have been expected to analyze threats and
prevent them from materializing.
Protection of civilians mandates are more and more common in
contemporary peacekeeping missions,61 often taking the form of an authorization
58
59

60

61

Cf. Section V.A, infra.
Cf. Scott Sheeran & Catherine Kent, Protection of Civilians, Responsibility to Protect, and Humanitarian
Intervention: Conceptual and Normative Interactions, in PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 29, 56 (Haidi Willmot
et al. eds., 2016) (“[W]hile mandates provide a right to use force, whether they imply an obligation as
such is unclear.”); Siobhan Wills, International Responsibility for Ensuring the Protection of Civilians, in
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS, supra, at 224, 228–31. The U.N.’s human rights due diligence policy is
an example of risk giving rise to an obligation in a related area.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc.
A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000); see also S.C. Pres. Statement 1999/6 (Feb. 12, 1999).
Sheeran & Kent, supra note 59, at 42 (“A critical development in U.N. peacekeeping since the late
1990s has been the inclusion of the use of force to protect civilians as a mission task.”). The first
peacekeeping mission to have such a mandate was the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone in 1999. As of
2016, fourteen missions had such a mandate. Id. at 44.
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to use force to protect (without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the
territorial state) “civilians under threat of physical violence.”62 The way the
Council has glossed such mandates makes clear that in the sense used here,
“threat” is risk-based. For instance, the United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stability Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been tasked with stabilizing
“areas where civilians are at risk,” and protection of civilians is defined to include
“active and effective patrolling in areas where civilians are at risk.”63 Likewise, the
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has been mandated to identify
threats against civilians “in areas at high risk.”64
U.N. doctrine documents confirm this. The 2011 Framework for Drafting
Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations counseled “[a]rticulat[ing] actual and potential POC risks in the
mission
area.”65
Likewise,
a
Department
of
Peacekeeping
Operations/Department of Field Support policy document speaks of “[f]orwardlooking threat and risk assessment [that] will enable the mission to anticipate and
prevent violence before it occurs.”66
Beyond U.N. peacekeeping, the Security Council has also authorized states
to use force in Libya where civilians were under threat of attack.67 And, the U.N.
has promulgated a human rights due diligence policy that provides that where
U.N. entities are contemplating support to non-U.N. security forces, they must
make an “assessment of the risks”68 and must not provide support under certain
conditions.

62

See, for example, S.C. Res. 2295, ¶ 19(c)(1) (June 29, 2016); S.C. Res. 2327, ¶ 7(a)(1) (Dec. 16, 2016);
S.C. Res. 2301, ¶ 33(a)(i) (July 26, 2016).

63

S.C. Res. 2295, supra note 62, at ¶ 19(c)(ii).
S.C. Res. 2327, supra note 62, at ¶ 7(a)(ii); see also S.C. Res. 2301, supra note 62, at ¶ 33(a)(i) (“To
protect . . . at risk communities, while mitigating risks to civilians posed by its military and police
operations.”); S.C. Res. 2348, ¶ 34(i)(b) (Mar. 31, 2017) (“[I]dentify[ing] threats to civilians and
implement[ing] existing prevention and response plans . . .”) (emphasis added).
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Framework for Drafting
Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1 (2011),
https://perma.cc/M6VB-QEDX.

64

65

66

U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, The Protection of
Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, ¶ 34 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/C73U-YHKX; see
also Rep. of the Indep. High-Level Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, Uniting Our Strengths for
Peace—Politics, Partnership and People, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. A/70/95–S/2015/446 (June 17, 2015).

67

S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing force “to protect civilians and civilian populated
areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”).

68

U.N. Secretary-General, Identical Letters Dated Feb. 25, 2013 from the Secretary-General
Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council,
annex I ¶ 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/67775–S/2013/110 (Mar. 5, 2013); id. at ¶ 14(f).
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But the Council has not only considered the question of whether to apply
risk-based standards, and not only used risk to create both obligations (sanctions)
and authorizations (protection of civilians), but has also had to wrestle with the
question of how to scope risk analysis. That is, the Council has had to consider
the question, “what risk”—posed by whom and to whom—“should matter.” Here,
again, protection of civilians is a useful lens. For instance, there has long been a
robust debate regarding how to address risk to civilians posed by the host
government. The U.N. Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), for example, was
authorized to use force to protect civilians, in particular from the use of heavy
weapons.69 This “effectively . . . allowed for much greater intervention by the U.N.
mission in the conflict” against outgoing President Gbagbo, who refused to
relinquish power.70 We have also recently begun to see discussion of risk to whom,
beyond simply civilians. Thus, for instance, Resolution 2304 also called for the
regional protection force in South Sudan to respond to potential attacks against
international and national humanitarian actors.71

III. T HE B IRTH OF R ISK -B ASED I NTERNATIONAL L AW
The Security Council practice I have described is only the tip of the iceberg.
In this Part, I take a step back and offer a brief (and necessarily not exhaustive)
history of risk analysis, principally through the lens of the work of the
International Law Commission (ILC), focusing in particular on prevention and
due diligence. In Section IV, I show how this evolving practice has culminated in
the broad use of risk, in various ways, across various areas of law.
Early on, risk principally arose in two contexts. The first was state
responsibility for harm to foreign nationals (as courts and tribunals wrestled with
whether states had done enough to prevent such harm, that is, whether they had
exercised due diligence in implementing a proto-prevention rule72). The second
was states’ authority to address threats, for instance when neutral states failed
during armed conflict adequately to mitigate the risk of belligerent behavior in
their waters. In both cases, although the relevant rules appeared facially to speak
to a state’s prevention obligations, they essentially functioned as authorizations.
That is, state responsibility for harm to foreign nationals fundamentally focused
on the question of whether the state of nationality was entitled to bring a claim
against the territorial state. Likewise, the law of neutrality was most concerned
69
70
71
72

S.C. Res. 1975, ¶ 6 (Mar. 30, 2011).
Wills, supra note 59, at 230.
S.C. Res. 2304, ¶ 10(c) (Aug. 12, 2016).
See Koivurova, supra note 19, at ¶ 4 (“[A] State could be held responsible if it was manifestly
negligent, i.e. failed to exercise due diligence in trying to prevent, redress or punish the damage to
the alien.”). I call it “proto-prevention” since much of the focus was in fact ex post rather than ex
ante.
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with whether, based on the threat presented by a belligerent operating in neutral
waters, another belligerent should be authorized to use force despite the fact that
force was being used on neutral territory. These two early examples of risk analysis
differed, however, in that the risk element in the doctrine of state responsibility
was at least in part assessed in more categorical terms, whereas the law of neutrality
prescribed a more case-by-case approach.
During a second phase, which coincided with the ILC’s early work on state
responsibility as currently conceived (i.e., not limited to harm to foreign nationals),
risk analysis began to be applied more broadly (that is, to additional areas of law).
But the dominant paradigm remained one of risk as authorization, and prevention
qua prevention was subordinate to the question of whether a claim could be
brought for failure to exercise due diligence. During a third phase, however, risk
as obligation began fully to emerge with a focus on prevention of transboundary
harm (and, more broadly, the development of international environmental law).73
At the same time, risk as authorization became perhaps less salient. During this
phase, there was frequent resort to procedural obligations (such as an obligation
to conduct an environmental impact assessment), which differed from earlier
more substantive risk authorizations. I trace each of these three phases in the
Sections that follow.

A. Phase 1: Early Due Diligence —State Responsibility and
Neutrality
In this Section, I describe the early uses of risk analysis and make the case
that the focus of risk analysis was on when and whether a state was authorized to
act—whether to bring a claim or to use force. This origin story is twofold. The
first part concerns the early law of state responsibility for harm to foreign
nationals,74 and in particular whether the lack of due diligence by one state
permitted another state to pursue a claim against it, and the second part concerns
the law of neutrality.75 I will describe each in turn.
The paradigmatic example of a claim predicated upon harm by private
citizens to a state’s national was where the territorial state failed to offer justice in
73

74

75

In part, this is the story of how due diligence in the context of state responsibility shifted from
being a way to attribute conduct to a state to a primary norm of conduct. Cf. Koivurova, supra note
19, at ¶¶ 5–6.
ILA Study Group, First Report, supra note 29, at 3 (“During the 19th and 20th centuries, due diligence
had particular relevance in the context of the protection of aliens.”).
As Justice Moore said in the S.S. Lotus Case, as early as 1927, “[i]t [was] well settled that a State [was]
bound to use due diligence to prevent the commission within its dominions of criminal acts against
another nation or its people.” The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 269 (Sept. 7, 1927), https://perma.cc/A9JA-RQRP.
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the wake of the harm.76 Thus, for instance, in a claim brought by a U.S. national
arising from the death of her husband and son in Mexico, Mexico was found liable
“by its failure to put the perpetrators to justice.”77 This was not risk-based.78
But this was not the only question relevant to such inter-state claims. Also
relevant were: (1) whether the territorial state knew of a risk to the foreign
national79; and (2) whether the territorial state had the capacity to address the risk.
These were more risk-based, although the former only insofar as knowledge could

76

As Dr. Robert Barnidge has put it, “[t]he Janes claim [which was based on failure to respond to
murders of Americans] ‘may be considered as the prototype.’” Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., The Due
Diligence Principle Under International Law, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 81, 93 (2006) (citing Janes v.
United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.IA.A. 82 (1925)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cf.
id. at 94 (labeling this the “nonrepression” theory). See also Clyde Eagleton, Denial of Justice in
International Law, 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 538, 540 (1928); F.V. García Amador (Special Rapporteur on
State Responsibility), Rep. on International Responsibility, 173, 222, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96 (Jan. 20,
1956) (quoting the Sub-Committee report of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the
Progressive Codification of International Law) [hereinafter García Amador, First Rep.]. For instance,
the Harvard Draft Convention on Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their Territory to
the Person or Property of Foreigners stated that state responsibility may be incurred where the state
failed to prevent injury and “local remedies have been exhausted without adequate redress.” Edwin
M. Borchard, The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their Territory to the Person or Property
of Foreigners, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 131, 134 (1929).

77

KULESZA, supra note 29, at 66. Many of the seminal cases of the U.S.-Mexico Claims Commission
concerned this kind of “denial of justice.” Edwin M. Borchard, Important Decisions of the Mixed Claims
Commission United States and Mexico, 21 AM. J. INT’L L. 516, 521 (1927). For a good example in another
context, see Poggioli (It. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 669 (1903), in which the umpire concluded that
Venezuela was responsible where “the local government failed to take ordinary and necessary
precautions and allowed the offenses complained of to go unpunished after becoming known.” Id.
at 690. See also KULESZA, supra note 29, at 69 (discussing Poggioli and describing “the inaction of state
bodies resulting in a gross denial of justice”).

78

In this regard, I am not fully persuaded by the characterization by the International Law Association
that the U.S.-Mexico Claims Commission articulated a set of objective factors to be taken into
account in determining the content of the due diligence obligation. ILA Study Group, First Report,
supra note 29, at 3.

79

Thus, for instance, in Boyd v. United Mexican States (U.S.-Mex.), 4 REP. OF INT’L ARBITRAL
AWARDS (1928), the U.S.-Mexico Commission relied in finding Mexico not liable on the fact that
only minor crime had occurred before bandits shot and killed an American national, and no
complaint of lack of protection had earlier been made to the Mexican government. Id. at 380. That
is, under those circumstances, Mexico might not have known of the risk. By contrast, in Chapman
v. United Mexican States (U.S.-Mex.), 4 REP. OF INT’L ARBITRAL AWARDS 632 (1930), a case where
the Commission found Mexico liable, the Commission emphasized that the U.S. national who
suffered harm had warned the Mexican government, but no Mexican official “had manifested more
than a passing interest.” Id. at 633. Cf. Barnidge, supra note 76, at 96 (discussing a case where
“Mexico had knowledge . . . [and how that] likely figured into the General Claims Commission’s
calculus in reaching a finding of state responsibility”).
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be constructive knowledge (since where the territorial state was explicitly warned
of a credible threat, there was very little risk assessment for the state to make).80
The question of state capacity as a basis for claims is perhaps most
interesting for these purposes. In the British Claims in Morocco81 case, for instance,
the arbitrator focused on what the territorial state could reasonably achieve.82 As
Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi has explained, by these lights the due diligence rule at
the time concerned “possessing, on a permanent basis, a legal and administrative
apparatus normally able to guarantee respect for the international norm on
prevention.”83 As another author pointed out at the time, the early doctrine of
protection of nationals was “ultimately concerned with the possibility of
maintaining a unified economic and social order for the conduct of international
trade and intercourse among independent political units.”84
Thus, insofar as risk featured in the early law of due diligence regarding
protection of nationals, it was with respect to the risk of general lawlessness, or,
occasionally, as proof of indirect knowledge. This was categorical risk assessment,
in the sense that the question was whether the territorial state had structures in
place to address kinds of risk (for example, crime). The law was little concerned
with the specifics of individual cases. The focus, moreover, remained principally
upon whether there were adequate local remedies.85 As a consequence, risk
ultimately played an authorizing function—that is, the existence of risk, often
coupled with a failure to address the consequences of its materialization,
authorized a state to make claims. There was little attention paid to the contours
of states’ prevention obligations.
I will turn now to the law of neutrality. I contend that risk in this area of law
was considered more contextually, but again it provided authorization for states
80

Cf. Case Concerning the Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 18–21 (Apr.
9).

81

Gr. Brit. v. Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 620 (2006) [hereinafter British Claims in Morocco].
See id. at 644 (the rule “offre en fait aux États, pour leurs ressortissants, le degré de sécurité auquel
ils peuvent raisonnablement s’attendre” [the rule offers in fact to states, for their nationals abroad,
the degree of security they could reasonably expect]); see also Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due
Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States, 35 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 9, 27 (1992).
Cf. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 65–66 (May 24) (comparing Iran’s response to what it had done
some months before in a comparable situation).

82

83
84

85

Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 82, at 26 (citing Gr. Brit. v. Morocco, supra note 81).
FREDERICK S. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS: A STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1932).
García Amador, First Rep., supra note 76, at 204 (calling exhaustion “[o]ne of the principles most
firmly laid down in international law”). This preoccupation was driven by the view that wrongful
acts were seen to “damage interests which, in the final analysis, vest in the State exclusively.” Id. at
181.
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to act. The focus was not on what states were expected to do to address risk. The
seminal early case in the law of neutrality was the Alabama Claims Arbitration of
1872. These claims involved British failure to halt construction of vessels that
were armed and used by the Confederacy during the U.S. Civil War, despite U.S.
warnings of the risk these vessels’ construction posed. The Treaty of Washington,
which established the arbitral tribunal that decided these claims, reflected
agreement by the parties that a neutral state was expected to use due diligence to
prevent the fitting out of a vessel it had reasonable grounds to believe was
intended to cruise or carry out war.86 The tribunal went on to hold the U.K. liable,
relying in part on the warnings the U.S. had offered.87 The tribunal specifically
concluded that “‘due diligence’ . . . ought to be exercised by neutral governments
in exact proportion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed,
from a failure to fulfil [sic] the obligations of neutrality on their part.”88 Thus, the
tribunal appeared to require that a neutral government assess on a case-by-case
basis the risk posed by particular activities. Subsequent treaties included language
to similar effect.89
But the law of neutrality was actually little concerned with glossing ex ante
what a state was required to do to fulfill those obligations—characterized as a
“comparatively simple duty”90—and instead often focused on whether a
belligerent was justified in taking action against an opposing vessel in a neutral’s
territorial waters on the basis of the threat it presented where the neutral had failed

86

THOMAS WILLING BALCH, THE ALABAMA ARBITRATION 119 (1900). The U.K. asserted that it did
not accept that these principles reflected international law, but for purposes of friendly resolution
of the Alabama Claims, the Tribunal should proceed as if they did. Id. at 120.

87

Id. at 130 (“[I]t omitted, notwithstanding the warnings and official representations made by the
diplomatic agents of the United States during the construction of the said number ‘290,’ to take in
due time any effective measures of prevention.”).
U.S. v. Gr. Brit., 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 129 (2012).

88
89

Both the Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land art. 5, Oct. 28, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654, and the Hague
Convention (XIII) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War art. 25, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 1 Bevans 723, included due diligence obligations. See also Hague Convention
(XIII), supra, at art. 8 (“A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent . . .
the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise, or to engage in hostile
operations.”) (emphasis added); Ashley Deeks, ‘Unwilling or Unable’: Toward a Normative Framework
for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 498 (2012).

90

ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 228 (1955).
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to execute its duties.91 Norway’s investigation of the Altmark, and the U.K. action
against that vessel, are good examples of this.92
Thus, as one commentator has put it more generally, during the League of
Nations period—and indeed, I would say, through World War II—there was
“little attention given to prevention.”93 Rather, to the extent risk arose, it arose
principally in the context of substantive rules regarding authorization to take
particular actions (whether with respect to claims or the use of force) on the basis
of a failure to exercise due diligence or the resulting threat. In the next Section, I
describe how the role risk played remained roughly similar through World War II
and the post-war period in the sense that risk generally functioned as an
authorization; I also demonstrate, however, how a predicate was being laid to
risk’s expansion, both with respect to its role and with respect to a broadening of
the areas of law to which it was relevant.

B. Phase 2: Trail Smelter and the ILC’s Initial Work on Modern
State Responsibility
In this Section, I trace the story of due diligence through the World War II
and post-war periods. This period is one of transition in that risk’s role remained
relatively static but two developments laid the groundwork for the subsequent
dramatic expansion of risk’s relevance to international law. Starting with the latter,
the two key developments were: (1) the focus of state responsibility broadened,
beyond exclusively harm to foreign nationals94 and to include transboundary harm,
as well as harm caused by non-state actors over which a state exercised sufficient
control; and (2) increasing attention was paid to the quantum of harm (as had been
the case with respect to neutrality doctrine), which started a more robust
conversation about how to assess harm (and, ultimately, the risk thereof).
Nevertheless, while risk began to feature more prominently, risk remained
principally relevant with respect to questions of whether a state was authorized to
act.
The first major change of this period was that due diligence mattered in areas
of law beyond injury to foreign nationals. Perhaps the most prominent reflection

91

Id. at 220, 220 n.55 (noting that “a neutral state is not an insurer of fulfilment of its neutral duties”
and arguing for the rights of a belligerent to take action in the event such duties are not fulfilled);
id. at 226 & 226 n.68 (noting that the law “fails to indicate with precision the character and scope
of the preventive obligation”); see also id. at 223 (discussing the situation where the neutral made
appropriate efforts—but was unable ultimately—to suppress the threat posed by the vessel).

92
93

Id. at 237–38, 237–39 n. 87.
KULESZA, supra note 29, at 120.

94

Cf. id. at 120 (discussing League of Nations work as “limited to damages done to foreigners”).
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of this is the Trail Smelter case.95 That case concerned transboundary harm.
Likewise, within the ILC in the early 1960s, there was robust debate about whether
state responsibility should be made broader than the question of responsibility for
harm to non-citizens96 (and of course it was). Coupled with this subject-matter
expansion, there was increasing focus on state support to non-state actors and
when that should trigger state responsibility (as opposed simply to when it should
be triggered by direct state action or state inaction). For instance, one author cites
a Soviet complaint to the U.S. about the activities of anti-Castro forces in Cuba
who were alleged to have shelled a Soviet merchant ship.97 This line of logic
ultimately (albeit later) culminated in the ICJ’s Nicaragua case, in which the court
focused on whether the U.S. exercised “effective control” of the contras for
purposes of state responsibility.98 These two developments opened the aperture
with respect to what and whose risks were relevant.
The second major change was that attention was increasingly being paid to
how to understand harm. Thus, while Trail Smelter is often cited in discussion of
prevention of transboundary harm, the tribunal essentially assumed potential state
responsibility for injurious acts by private parties.99 Instead, its focus was on the
definition of an injurious act.100 Indeed, the tribunal’s famous pronouncement is
that the injury must be “of serious consequences and . . . established by clear and
convincing evidence.”101 This effected an important shift in focus from the
conduct of the state alone to the harm. It was a predicate to a more robust use of
risk analysis, which often requires understanding likely harm, and not just what a
state did or did not do.
95

Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (2006).

96

Roberto Ago (Chairman of the Sub-Committee on State Responsibility), Rep. on State Responsibility,
[1963] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 253, UN Doc. A/CN.4/152 (Jan. 16, 1963).

97

Barnidge, supra note 76, at 109.
Military & Paramilitary Activities in & Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27). See generally Oona A. Hathaway et al., Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article
1 and State Responsibility for Non-State Actors, 51 TEX. L. REV. 539, 549 (2017).

98

99

100

101

Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, Strict Liability in International Environmental Law, in LAW OF THE
SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A.
MENSAH 1131, 1131 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007) (“The arbitral agreement
itself recognized the responsibility of a State for the acts of non-State actors as well as those of the
State or its organs.”).
Trail Smelter, supra note 95, at 1963 (“[T]he real difficulty often arises rather when it comes to
determine what . . . is deemed to constitute an injurious act.”).
Id. at 1965. Cf. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Of Paradoxes, Precedents, & Progeny: The Trail Smelter Arbitration
65 Years Later, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL
SMELTER ARBITRATION 34, 38 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006) (“The U.S.
view seems to have been that if ‘fumigations’ sufficient to cause injury continued to occur in
Washington, the United States would have grounds for complaint, no matter what remedial works
had been installed by the company, and regardless of their effect.”).
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Despite these changes, risk analysis remained principally a source of
authorization—and not just under the law of neutrality (although that continued
to be an important focus102). For example, while the theory of defense of nationals
was debated by this point, any right to use force that was recognized was seen not
as arising from a breach of an obligation, but rather as the exercise of a right.103
Similarly, a focus on authorization continued to characterize the discussion of
state responsibility.104 Indeed, the very use of the term “responsibility” in the ILC’s
papers was initially understood to mean the consequence of unlawful conduct
(whereas “liability” described a primary obligation).105
Another element of continuity is that risk continued to be considered
generally (facially) under a variety of circumstances, rather than on a case-by-case
basis. Thus, F.V. García Amador (the ILC’s first special rapporteur on state
responsibility) characterized what was at issue in Trail Smelter as a breach of a
general duty “implicit in the function of the State . . . namely, the duty to ensure
102

A key development during this period was the U.S. use of force in Cambodia. See generally STEPHEN
C. NEFF, THE RIGHTS & DUTIES OF NEUTRALS: A GENERAL HISTORY 211–12 (2000) (discussing
this as an example of the invocation of self-defense). Then-State Department Legal Adviser John
Stevenson explained that the North Vietnamese had used Cambodian territory for attacks against
South Vietnam and that while the Cambodian government had made some effort to suppress these
attacks, they had failed to accomplish this end. Stevenson then said that where compensation for
breach of a neutral’s duties would not be sufficient, “the injured belligerent has the right of selfhelp or, at a minimum, the right to exercise such self-help consistent with the right of self-defense.”
John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Statement to the N.Y.C. Bar Association on
Legal Aspects of U.S. Military Action in Cambodia (May 28, 1970), https://perma.cc/W6N46UDS. In some sense, this could be considered a remedy for breach of a risk obligation. But the
focus was sufficiently squarely on when a state was authorized to take action, that I classify this as
risk as authorization. Cf. supra note 30.

103

D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (1958). As Bowett has remarked, “the
essence of action in self-defence is that it should be a measure of protection, not punishment.” Id.
at 99. Indeed, the view was taken that before seeking to take action to protect nationals, a state
must exhaust local remedies. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Note, Defending Nationals Abroad: Assessing the
Lawfulness of Forcible Hostage Rescues, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 452, 472 (2008). Exhaustion requirements tend
to deflect attention from what a state is expected to do ex ante and keep the focus on the
circumstances under which another state is authorized to take action. See supra Section III(A).
The first draft articles continued to focus on the question of local remedies (and hence authorization
to bring claims). See F.V. García Amador (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Second Rep.
on International Responsibility, 105, UN Doc. A/CN.4/106 (Feb. 15, 1957); see also Roberto Ago
(Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), First Rep. on State Responsibility, 143, 145, [1969] 2 Y.B.
Int’l L. Comm’n 125, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217 (May 7, 1969) (discussing the 1961 revised Harvard
Draft Convention on Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their Territory to the Person or
Property of Foreigners, which suggested that due diligence was only breached if the territorial state
failed to apprehend the non-state actor who caused injury).
Julio Barboza (Special Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law), Second Rep. on International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 145, UN Doc. A/CN.4/402 (May
13, 1986). This understanding subsequently shifted. Id. at 146.

104

105
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that in its territory conditions prevail which guarantee the safety of persons and
property.”106 Likewise, the prevention obligations of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations with respect to the inviolability of diplomatic missions and
personnel were little considered107 until a subsequent rash of kidnappings and
hostage takings prompted the General Assembly to adopt a new Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. Even that latter Convention focused
principally on criminalization (akin to the earlier debate about whether the
territorial state had seen justice done for crimes against a foreign national), rather
than setting forth a more detailed set of risk-based obligations. This is also the
period when there is considerable growth in treaty-based investment
protections.108 Many such treaties included a requirement that “[i]nvestment shall
. . . enjoy full protection and security.”109 During the immediately post-war period,
this was generally seen as protection against risks of an unfair legal system.110
Thus, the role risk played remained relatively static. But as the scope of
legally-relevant risk broadened, and as harm increasingly came into focus, the way
was cleared for risk to play new legally-relevant roles. In the next Section, I turn
to those developments.

C. The Rise of Risk as Obligation
In this Section, I outline how risk began playing different roles beginning
roughly in 1970, when the ILC inaugurated its work on international liability for
injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law. In
particular, this period was marked by a flowering of risk as obligation, as opposed
to authorization, by virtue of a sustained focus on what prevention rules entail
when married with a due diligence standard. Risk also began to give rise to
procedural obligations and was considered more frequently on a case-by-case rather
than categorical basis (although case-by-case analysis was not always a deep look).
At the same time, through roughly 2001, while the question of which risks
were relevant continued to receive ever more expansive answers (for instance,
106

García Amador, Second Rep., supra note 104, at 106.

107

EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS 258 (2016); see also Ignatiev v. United States, 238 F.3d. 464 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

108

Cf. ILA Study Group, First Report, supra note 29, at 6 (linking due diligence to investment law); George
K. Foster, Recovering ‘Protection and Security’: The Treaty Standard’s Obscure Origins, Forgotten Meaning, and
Key Current Significance, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1095, 1126 (2012) (linking this to the protection
of aliens doctrine and discussing Mexico-U.S. Mixed Claims Commission cases).

109

Foster, supra note 108, at 1097.
Id. at 1133 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 6565, COMMERCIAL TREATY PROGRAM OF THE
UNITED STATES (1958)).

110
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private actions, and not just those of which the state had knowledge or that the
state supported, were deemed to present legally relevant risks), with respect to
subject matter, risk analysis stayed in a somewhat narrow lane (generally
transboundary environmental harm). Likewise, while risk-based law began to
move slightly away from the dyadic paradigm-which had, to a certain extent,
flowed from the concept of risk as claims-authorization111-the conversation about
which risk bearers were relevant was only just beginning.
To illustrate these trends, in this Section I focus in particular on the evolution
of the law governing transboundary harm (and related developments with regard
to due diligence and prevention), the development of the precautionary approach
(and its treatment in litigation, in particular before the ICJ, the WTO Appellate
Body, and the ITLOS), and debate regarding the defense of nationals. This is
necessarily something of a sketch, given the vast literature on the first two topics
in particular.
Perhaps the most important development—and certainly the first—was
that, in 1970, the ILC divided its project on state responsibility into state
responsibility and “risk liability,”112 which was understood to be a set of rules
governing the relationship between states with respect to activities that might
cause or had caused harm, but which were not internationally wrongful. A key
difference between state responsibility and state liability was that state
responsibility required wrongful conduct, but not necessarily harm, whereas state
liability required harm (or at least a risk thereof), but not unlawful conduct.113 This
111

XUE HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2003); Catherine Tinker,
State Responsibility and the Precautionary Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION at 53, 54 (David Freestone & Ellen
Hey eds., 1996) (discussing “the classic model, which poses a bilateral conflict between one state as
actor and another state as victim, with significant physical harm occurring across national
boundaries”); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
581 (2012) (discussing the view that “only states may invoke the responsibility of other states, and
only when specially affected by the breach”); Roberto Ago (Special Rapporteur on State
Responsibility), Second Rep. on State Responsibility, [1970] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 177, 184, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/233 (Apr. 20, 1970) (suggesting that a wrongful act gives rise to a right to reparation on
the part of one specific state).

112

Ago, Second Rep., supra note 111, at 178; see also Alan E. Boyle, State Responsibility and International
Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?, 39
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 3 (1990). Cf. 1013th Meeting on State Responsibility, [1969] 1 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 114, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217 (noting the suggestion by some ILC members to address
risk under the rubric of state responsibility, which Special Rapporteur Ago disclaimed in his first
report).

113

Mark A. Drumbl, Trail Smelter and the International Law Commission’s Work on State Responsibility for
Internationally Wrongful Acts and State Liability, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 101, at 85, 87 (“State liability differs from state responsibility insofar as it covers situations
in which no illegal or unlawful conduct has occurred, although the conduct has triggered harm.”);
Sompong Sucharitkul, State Responsibility and International Liability under International Law, 18 LOY. L.A.
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greater focus on harm, and, indeed, risk of harm,114 as opposed to the attribution
of wrongful conduct,115 opened the door significantly to risk analysis.116 As
Gunther Handl has said, the ILC’s work exceeded “a study of reparation . . . [and
began to cover] the management, in general, of transnational risks.”117

114

115

116

117

INT'L & COMP. L.J. 821, 834 (1996) (“Injury or damage is not an element of state responsibility” but
“under international liability, there is no breach of a primary obligation if no appreciable harm or
injurious consequence results.”). The theory at the time was that knowing transboundary harm
might engage state responsibility, and so too might a breach of a state’s due diligence obligations to
prevent harm. Cf. Gunther Handl, Trail Smelter in Contemporary International Environmental Law: Its
Relevance in the Nuclear Energy Context, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 101, at 125, 130, 132 (“Trail Smelter suggests that any such effects [significant transboundary
effects] would constitute internationally prohibited conduct[,]” and lack of due diligence “bears on
whether there has been a breach of a state’s obligation entailing responsibility for the transboundary
harm occasioned.”). But an accident would not, see Report of the International Law Commission on the Work
of its Forty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/40/10, reprinted in [1993] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 24 (part 2)
(“The Special Rapporteur explained that activities involving risk were chiefly those which may cause
transboundary harm due to accidents.”). Gunther Handl points in particular to situations where
there is a “[s]tatistical probability that given the nature of the activity concerned, harm will occur,
reasonable precautionary measures notwithstanding.” Gunther Handl, Liability as an Obligation
Established by a Primary Rule of International Law, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 49, 64 (1985).
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law,
[1992] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 42, 51, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (“Attention should be focused at this
stage on drafting articles in respect of activities having a risk of causing transboundary harm.”). One
of the justifications for discussing risk was that states had not consented to assume certain risks
emanating from conduct on the territory of their neighbors—unlike nationals affirmatively
choosing to reside on the territory of a state other than their state of nationality. See Report of the
Working Group on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law, [1978] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 151, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.284 (“In the situations
that fall within the present topic, there is no presumption of willingness to accept risks or harmful
consequences because they are tolerated within the territory or control of the State in which those
risks or harmful consequences arise.”) [hereinafter International Liability Working Group];
KULESZA, supra note 29, at 170 (“[T]here is no presumed consent of the state to take upon itself the
risk of dangerous acts.”).
Knowledge was not required. There was some discussion of whether the territorial state must have
had “means of knowing” of the risk in order for the draft articles to apply. This proposal was
primarily to shelter developing countries. Julio Barboza (Special Rapporteur on International
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law),
Fourth Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law, 262, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/413 (Apr. 6, 1988) (A “means of knowing” test has as
“its primary aim . . . to protect developing countries, which sometimes lack the means to be aware
of everything that goes on within their territory”). But this concept was ultimately rejected. Id. at
263 (ultimately suggesting deletion of the test).
The first draft articles identified the probability of harm as one of the relevant factors to balance in
a proposed balancing test. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter (Special Rapporteur on International Liability
for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law), Third Rep.
on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law,
64, § 6(1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360 (June 23, 1982).
Handl, supra note 113, at 50.
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The state liability project relied on risk to impose prevention-type
obligations, in particular not to cause harm, or to mitigate the risk thereof.118 As
Robert Quentin-Baxter, the ILC’s first special rapporteur on the subject, said,
liability was meant as “a negative asset, an obligation, in contra-distinction to a
right.”119
The ILC also had long debates regarding how to assess risk, in particular
how categorical or how contextual an approach should be taken. The ILC sought
to establish a threshold of potential harm that would trigger application of what
ultimately became draft articles on the prevention of transboundary harm (in other
words, de minimis risk of harm was not foreseen as within the scope of coverage).120
This led to questions regarding: whether risk should have a qualitative
detectability;121 whether the ILC should promulgate a list of risky activities, which
could then be periodically updated;122 and at what level of specificity risk should
118

119

120

121

122

Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities and Commentaries Thereto, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 153 [hereinafter Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm] (“The State of origin shall
take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize
the risk thereof.”).
Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter (Special Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law), First Rep. on International
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 250, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/334 (June 24, 1980) (emphasis added); see also Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter (Special
Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law), Fourth Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 213, UN Doc. A/CN.4/373 (June 27, 1983).
The threshold ultimately chosen was “significant” risk. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary
Harm, supra note 118, at 153 (“The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent
significant transboundary harm . . . .”); id. at 152 (“The obligations of prevention imposed on States
are thus not only reasonable but also sufficiently limited so as not to impose such obligations in
respect of virtually any activity.”).
Before “significant risk” was chosen, Barboza had suggested that the standard be “appreciable risk,”
which he defined as “of some magnitude and that it must be either clearly visible or easy to deduce
from the properties of the things or materials used.” Julio Barboza (Special Rapporteur on
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by
International Law), Third Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law, 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/405 (Mar. 16, 1987). The ILC debated whether
this standard, which connotes detectability, should be preferred to “significant,” which connotes
the quantum of risk. International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law, [1989] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 83, 91–92, U.N. Doc. A/44/10 at 91–92. (The
Special Rapporteur appeared to take the view that “appreciable” meant both detectable and
significant. Julio Barboza (Special Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law), Sixth Rep. on International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 88, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/428
(Mar. 15, 1990).)
Documents of the Thirty-Ninth Session, [1987] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 44, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1987. The draft Articles proposed by the Special Rapporteur in 1990 included an
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be assessed (for example, at the level of an “activity” or as applied in particular
circumstances).123 All of this evidenced a critical inquiry into whether to apply a
contextual or categorical approach, and what each would mean.124
Finally, while the draft articles the ILC ultimately proposed included a due
diligence obligation with respect to the prevention of harm, the ILC’s work on
risk assessment procedures was more detailed.125 Indeed, this period saw the
exemplary list of dangerous substances. Barboza, Sixth Rep., supra note 121, at 105. Cf. Julio Barboza
(Special Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not
Prohibited by International Law), Eighth Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/443 (Apr. 15, 1992) (“The
Commission and the Sixth Committee did not prove receptive to the inclusion of such a concept
or, consequently, to the resulting amendments.”).
123

124

125

Barboza, Fourth Rep., supra note 115, at 256 (“[T]he risk must be general. In other words, it need
not relate to specific cases, since our point of reference is no longer the act but the activity.”).
Questions were also raised regarding whether certain activities should give rise to strict liability even
where appropriate preventive measures were taken (because of the magnitude of the likely harm).
Gunther Handl, State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons, 74
AM. J. INT’L L. 525, 541 (1980) (“[T]he crucial element in a state’s original liability for private
activities turns out to be the transnational significance of the risk.”); HANQIN, supra note 111, at 302
(“[J]urists propose[d] that . . . strict liability should be imposed on States . . . when transboundary
damage is caused by abnormally dangerous activities.”). Compare Barboza, Fourth Rep., supra note
115, at 254 (suggesting a standard of “highly likely to cause transboundary injury”) (emphasis added),
and Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of the Fortieth Session, 1988 2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 14, A/CN.4/SER.A/1988 (“The Special Rapporteur admitted that the concept of risk
as defined in draft article 2 (a) did not seem to cover properly activities with low risk but with the
potential of great harm.”), with Julio Barboza (Special Rapporteur on International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law), Fifth Rep. on
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 134,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/423 (1989) (defining risk to include “both the low probability of very
considerable [disastrous] transboundary harm and the high probability of minor appreciable harm”).
Cf. Handl, Trail Smelter in Contemporary International Environmental Law, supra note 113, at 133 (“[T]he
Tribunal’s decision does not directly cast a light on the status of threatened transboundary harms
when the possible consequences are extremely serious but are low probability.”).
Cf. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 118, at 149–50 (noting that the idea
of a list had been rejected but that the word “activity” had been retained, which had been
understood to be somewhat categorical). The ESPOO convention, on the other hand, includes a
list of specific activities in its Appendix 1, Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context art. 1(3), Jan. 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 802 [hereinafter ESPOO Convention],
and has procedures for identifying additional activities that should be subject by consent of the
parties to the procedures of the convention, id. at art. 2(5).
Compare Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 118, at 153 (draft article 3 is “in
the nature of a statement of principle”), and id. at 155 (discussing different due diligence owed by
states of differing levels of development), with id. at 157–66 (draft articles of a more procedural
nature). Cf. Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao (Special Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: Prevention of
Transboundary Damage from Hazardous Activity), First Rep. on Prevention of Transboundary Damage
from Hazardous Activities, 209–18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/487 (Mar. 18, 1998) (identifying precautions,
which may also be procedural, polluter pays, which concerns liability not risk assessment, and
equity, capacity, and good governance as the “substantive” principles underlying the enterprise).
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inauguration of reticulated procedural obligations. Elements of the schematic
outline that the ILC originally considered in its work on the topic were entirely
procedural in nature.126 And, ultimately, commentators127 and the ILC began to
focus on environmental impact assessments.128 As one commentator has put it,
“[i]ncreasingly, the international legal community deals with the need to mitigate
risks and prevent environmental harm through a sophisticated network of
international procedural obligations.”129
The focus on harm, and its prevention, not only reflected a turn to risk as
obligation (rather than risk as authorization), but it also broadened the aperture to
permit greater scrutiny of non-state actor conduct. That is, a greater set of risks
became legally relevant. As Quentin-Baxter said in his first report, “[a] State within
whose jurisdiction such an injury or danger is caused is not justified in refusing its
co-operation upon the ground that the cause of the danger was not, or is not,
126

127

128

129

Quentin-Baxter, Third Rep., supra note 116, at 62–64. This is not surprising, since the core of the
ILC’s early thinking on the subject had been that harm that might be caused by acts not prohibited
by international law should generally be addressed by a balancing test. International Liability
Working Group, supra note 114, at 151. The expectation was that states would agree on specific
regimes to cover such activity. Quentin-Baxter, First Rep., supra note 119, at 250.
Gunther Handl, The Principle of ‘Equitable Use’ As Applied to Internationally Shared Natural Resources: Its
Role in Resolving Potential International Disputes Over Transfrontier Pollution, 14 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT
INT’L 40, 56 (1978) (“In fact they [duties to negotiate] presuppose what might be called the ‘duty to
make an environmental impact assessment.’”).
As early as the Secretariat's study of 1984, the example of EIAs was discussed. Survey of State Practice
Relevant to International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International
Law, 12–13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/384 (Oct. 16, 1984). Some had, however, wished assessments to
be undertaken in a more ‘objective’ manner. See, for example, Quentin-Baxter, Third Rep., supra note
116, at 63, § 3(6)(a) (suggesting joint fact-finding); Barboza, Third Rep., supra note 121, at 50
(asserting that where there are disagreements about risk, “the objective opinion of a third party is
the only way out of the impasse”); Barboza, Fifth Rep., supra note 123, at 146–47. The ILC was not
alone in coming to rely on environmental impact assessments or the like. See, for example, U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 206, Nov. 16, 1994, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; ESPOO Convention,
supra note 124, at art. 1(vi); id. at app. 2(d), 2(f) (discussing estimation and predictions). That said,
the precise legal status of such procedural obligations under general international law remained
uncertain, and the ICJ did not provide clear guidance on this point. See Erika L. Preiss, The
International Obligation to Conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment: The ICJ Case Concerning the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 308 (1999) (“While the case presented the
Court with an opportunity to establish clearly and advocate the many emerging doctrines of
international environmental law, the majority of the Court declined to utilize it.”); Request for an
Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1995 IC.J. Rep. 288, 342, 344 (Sept.
22) (dissenting opinion of Weeramantry, J.). The ILC also focused considerable attention on a
variety of other procedural obligations, such as notification rules, relying for instance on the seminal
Lac Lanoux case in that regard. See Case Concerning Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281, 308
(2006).
CAROLINE E. FOSTER, SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS: EXPERT EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF AND FINALITY 7 (2011).
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within its knowledge or control.”130 Moreover, the ILC not only wrestled with the
question of whose conduct should be covered, but also whose rights were
implicated where harm occurred. This is the era of the ICJ’s decision in Barcelona
Traction, in which the court appeared to move away from a necessarily dyadic,
inter-state concept.131 While the ILC was hesitant to address general
environmental risk,132 the issue had been joined, and it began to arise in other areas
of risk-based law.133 It has continued to grow in prominence.
Despite these profound advances, however, the ILC’s project remained
tethered to a limited set of harms. For instance, the ILC explicitly restricted the
coverage of its draft articles on prevention of transboundary harm to acts causing
physical damage134 emanating from the territory or areas under the jurisdiction or
control of another state.135 Even if not explicitly, the ILC’s work was also
understood principally to concern environmental law.136
The second significant development of the period was the explosive growth
of the concept of precaution. This too fueled the rise of risk as procedural
obligation, to be assessed contextually. There has been some question whether
precaution should be understood to concern authorization137 or obligation138—

130

Quentin-Baxter, First Rep., supra note 119, at 264.

131

Case Concerning Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain),
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5) (“In view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.”);
CRAWFORD, supra note 111, at 583; HANQIN, supra note 111, at 238.

132

Barboza, Sixth Rep., supra note 121, at 101–02.
Thus, for instance, the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) program began in the late 1970s and BITs
differed from FCNs in that they generally permitted individuals to bring claims directly. Key
provisions of BITs spoke to preventive actions that states should take with regard to the risk of
violence. See Christoph Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, 1 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1, 2
(2010) (citing Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic (Neth. v. Czech), S.C.C. Case 088/2004, Partial
Award, at 42–43 (2007)).
Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 118, at 151 (noting “physical
consequences”); see also Rao First Rep., supra note 125, at 194 (“[r]ejecting suggestions to expand the
scope to include economic and social activities”); HANQIN, supra note 111, at 5 (“Th[e] first
definitional element . . . serves to exclude activities which may cause consequential damage across
a border, but not of a ‘physical’ character.”).

133

134

135

Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 118, at 150–51; see also Rao, First Rep.,
supra note 125, at 197.

136

Cf. Rao, First Rep., supra note 125, at 182.
Peel, Precaution, supra note 21, at 491 (“One way of conceptualising what might be meant by
precaution as an approach . . . is to say that it authorises or permits regulators to take precautionary
measures in certain circumstances, without dictating a particular response in all cases.”).

137

138

Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1028 (2003) (asserting
that precaution is paralyzing because “it stands as an obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and
to everything in between”). But cf. John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM.
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that is, does uncertainty require states to regulate (or prohibit) risky activity or does
uncertainty authorize states (despite countervailing norms) to promulgate such
regulations (or prohibitions). But litigation during this period tended to reject
precaution as authorization in favor of precaution as obligation.139 Thus, for
instance, in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project the ICJ considered a
claim that a state of ecological necessity, or “ecological risk,”140 excused abrogating
a treaty. The Court concluded, however, that because the risk was insufficiently
certain, it did not give rise to a state of necessity.141 Around the same time, the
question of precaution as authorization was joined in litigation under the WTO
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which
requires that WTO members ensure that measures “are based on an assessment .
. . of the risks.”142 The U.S. and Canada challenged European prohibitions on
importing beef from cows treated with certain growth hormones, arguing that
European regulations had not relied on a risk assessment. The European
Communities argued on the other hand that “[t]he precautionary principle is . . .
a general customary rule of international law” and asserted that it permitted them
to rely on the possibility of risk to regulate in advance of a full understanding of
the risks of the hormones.143 The Appellate Body concluded that “the
precautionary principle does not, by itself . . . relieve a panel from the duty of
applying the normal (that is, customary international law) principle of treaty

139

140
141
142

143

& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 15 (2002) (arguing that strong versions of the precautionary
principle “have been systematically tamed”).
I distinguish authorization from the classical formulation of the precautionary principle (a potential
third way of understanding the precautionary approach), which provides that lack of scientific
certainty should not preclude certain decisions. See, for example, Rio Declaration, supra note 21. I also
consider European litigation regarding mad cow disease, sometimes cited for the proposition that
precaution acted as authorization, see FOSTER, supra note 129, at 24 (“EU institutions are empowered
to take protective measures . . . .”) (emphasis added), not entirely apposite, since precaution entered
the equation with respect to the court’s proportionality calculation regarding the specific restrictions
imposed, see Case C-180/96, United Kingdom v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1998 E.C.R. I02265, ¶¶ 98–99, 103.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.-Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 37 (Sept. 25).
Id. at ¶ 54 (discussing the “objective existence of a ‘peril’”) (emphasis added).
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 5.1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter SPS Agreement].
E.C. Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Rep. of the Appellate Body, ¶
16, U.N. Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, (Jan. 16, 1998); see also id. at ¶ 29 (“‘Risk,’ for the purposes of the
SPS Agreement, is the ‘potential’ for the harm or adverse effects . . . and, therefore, the mere
possibility of risk arising suffices for the purposes of Articles 5.1 and 5.2.” (citing SPS Agreement,
supra note 142)). But see id. at ¶ 43 (describing the U.S. view that precautionary principle “cannot
create a risk assessment where there is none”).

624

Vol. 18 No. 2

The Rise of Risk in International Law

Townley

interpretation . . . [and] the precautionary principle does not override the
provisions of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement.”144
Courts proved (at least somewhat) more sympathetic to claims that
precaution required state action.145 For instance, in the New Zealand v. France146 case
before the ICJ, while the court did not reopen its 1974 dismissal of New Zealand’s
claim, in a much cited dissent Judge Weeramantry characterized the
“precautionary principle” as a rule to help parties who lack sufficient information
to show a threat nevertheless to litigate whether an opposing party, who might
have greater access to information, has indeed done enough to avert the potential
risk.147 The concept of precaution as obligation was also raised in a dispute
between Ireland and the U.K. regarding potential radioactive discharge from a
mixed oxide (MOX) nuclear reprocessing plant in the U.K.148 Ultimately, the
Tribunal gave Ireland some measure of satisfaction by requiring that the U.K. and
Ireland continue to exchange further information (although it did not necessarily
rely on precaution to do so).149 Thus, to the extent one can detect trends in the
interpretation of the precautionary approach during this period, they would favor
reading it in the vein of risk as obligation, rather than risk as authorization.
What was clear, however, was that precaution included procedural elements
(and did not concern only substance). Thus, for instance, Jacqueline Peel has
persuasively argued in favor of precaution as a process providing for the taking
144

Id. at ¶¶ 124–25; see also TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS, supra note 21, at 169 (“[T]he
approach taken by the Appellate Body . . . appears to be somewhat inconsistent with its recognition
that national governments may legitimately act in a cautious manner in the face of risk.”).

145

Precaution as obligation is also evidenced for instance by the Fish Stocks Agreement, The U.N.
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks art. 6(3)(b), 2167 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec.
11, 2001); id. at Annex II(2); see also 1996 Protocol to the London Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matters arts. 3(1), 4(1), 36 I.L.M. 1 (entered into
force Mar. 24, 2006).
N.Z. v. Fr., 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 288.

146
147

Id. at 342 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). I do not find the argument that the precautionary approach
entails a reversal of the burden of proof persuasive.

148

Compare MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of
Case of Ireland of Nov. 9, 2011, ¶ 101, 4 ITLOS Pleadings 5, with MOX Plant, (Ir. v. U.K.), Case
No. 10, Written Response of the United Kingdom of Nov. 15, 2011, ¶ 134, 4 ITLOS Pleadings
361. Cf. MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001, ¶ 71, 5 ITLOS Rep. 95
(“Considering that Ireland argues that the precautionary principle places the burden on the United
Kingdom to demonstrate that no harm would arise from discharges and other consequences of the
operation of the MOX plant.”).
MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Order of Dec. 3, 2001, ¶ 89, 5 ITLOS Rep. 95, 107–08. Likewise, in the
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, the ITLOS applied provisional measures after hearing arguments
that precaution served as obligation. See Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan),
Case Nos. 3 & 4, Order of August 27, 1999, ¶¶ 80, 85, 3 ITLOS Rep. 280, 293–94.

149
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into account “of scientific uncertainty in decision-making.”150 Indeed, a number
of the litigated cases ultimately resulted in orders to exchange information (this
was true of the MOX plant case as well as an ITLOS dispute between Singapore
and Malaysia regarding a Singaporean land reclamation project.151). The
precautionary approach also operated both in contextual and categorical terms.152
Finally, states also appeared to become increasingly skeptical of risk as
authorization for the use of force, at least with respect to the defense of nationals.
The theory of defense of nationals dates to the pre-U.N. Charter era153 and its
legal underpinnings appear not to have been much considered at the time.154 But
in the post-Charter period, there began to be robust debates about when the risk
to one’s nationals might justify the use of force on the territory of another state.
While the U.S. invoked defense of nationals to justify (at least in part) the use of
force in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama,155 and while John Dugard
sought to include in the ILC’s draft articles on diplomatic protection a reference
to the possibility of using force under limited circumstances to defend nationals,156
states were leery.157

150
151

152

153

Peel, supra note 21, at 497.
Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), Case No. 12, Order of Oct.
8, 2003, ¶ 106, 7 ITLOS Rep. 10, 47.
Consider, for instance, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, which
provides for listing of chemicals and stipulates that lack of scientific certainty shall not prevent a
listing proposal from proceeding. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants art.
8(7)(a), 2256 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force May 22, 2001).
See Security Council Official Records, 1939th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.1939, ¶ 106 (July 9, 1976)
(citing Judge Huber’s decision in Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (Gr. Brit. v. Spain), 2 R.I.A.A.
615 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1925)).

154

Andrew W.R. Thomson, Doctrine of the Protection of National Abroad: Rise of the Non-Combatant
Evacuation Operation, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 627, 630 (2012).

155

Tom Ruys, The ‘Protection of Nationals’ Doctrine Revisited, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 233, 244–45 (2008);
see Adlai Stevenson, Letter Dated Apr. 29, 1965 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/6310 (Apr. 29,
1965) (“American lives were in danger.”); U.N. SCOR, 2491st mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2491
(Oct. 27, 1983) (“Those circumstances included danger to innocent United States nationals, the
absence of a minimally responsible Government in Grenada and the danger posed to the OECS by
the relatively awesome military might that those responsible for the murder of the Bishop
Government how had their disposal.”); id. at 8 (“[I]t was fully reasonable for the United States to
conclude that these madmen might decide at any moment to hold hostage the 1,000 American
citizens on that island.”); U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2899th mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2899 (Dec.
20, 1989) (“designed to protect American lives”); id. at 32 (quoting President George H.W. Bush
that Noriega had “created an imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama”).

156

John R. Dugard (Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection), First Rep. on Diplomatic Protection,
218, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/506 (Apr. 7, 2000).

157

See Ruys, supra note 155, at 267.
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This then was the state of play at the end of the twentieth century—a
marrying of due diligence and prevention, which led to the rise of risk as obligation
as opposed to authorization, coupled with the ability to see it both as procedural
or substantive, something to be considered by category or on a case-by-case basis,
and an expanding, but as yet limited, scope. The last fifteen or so years, however,
have seen the use of risk truly flower, with risk analysis deployed across a wide
variety of fields and in myriad ways. It is to this I turn in the next Section.

IV. T HE R ISE OF R ISK
In this Section, I describe the role of risk in international law (and soft-law
commitments) since 2001.158 That role has increased dramatically, not only in that
risk is now used in many ways, but also with respect to risk’s scope of application.
In the first Section below, I show how risk has become relevant to new actors,
new harms, and new areas of law. In the Section that follows, I describe how risk
is now the subject of increasingly sophisticated analysis.

A. New Actor, New Harm
In this Section, I assess in turn two expansions of the role of risk in
international law—the first concerning who should undertake risk analysis and the
second regarding new types of harm and areas of law to which risk has become
legally relevant. Prior to the recent developments I describe here, risk was
something states were expected to assess, even where it was the conduct of nonstate actors that gave rise to the risk of harm and “harm” was (in the context of
environmental law, which was the principal area of law where risk played a role)
physical, transboundary harm to (the territory of) another state.159 But as Rebecca
Bratspies and Russell Miller note in the introduction to their useful volume on the
Trail Smelter case, “[r]edefining ‘harm’ also means confronting new actors and new
victims.”160 Thus, for instance, as John Ruggie has said of corporate human rights
due diligence, which I discuss in greater detail below, “[human rights impact
assessments] should deviate from the [environmental impact assessments]
approach of examining a project’s direct impacts, and instead force consideration

158

I choose this year somewhat arbitrarily but it was when the ILC completed its Draft Articles on
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, see supra note 118.

159

Compare with the sources listed in note 111, supra, which speak to the earlier “dyadic” approach to
harm. There, harm was something that occurred to a single other or identified set of states, as
opposed to something that could be claimed by any state.
Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller, Introduction to TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 101, at 1, 8.

160
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of how the project could possibly interact with each and every right.”161 In the
next two sub-sections, I describe how such an expansion has occurred—covering
new actors, new acts, and new victims.

1. New Actors
The first expansion concerns who should undertake risk analysis.
Increasingly, there is an international normative expectation that non-state actors
will also do so. This is evidenced by the widespread uptake of the U.N. Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (GPs),162 which are a non-binding set
of guidelines for states and businesses endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights
Council and constructed around a “protect, respect, and remedy” framework. 163
Under the U.N. GPs, businesses are expected to “respect” human rights.
Specifically, Guiding Principle 15 asserts that businesses should have a “human
rights due diligence process to identify prevent, mitigate and account for how they
address their impacts on human rights,”164 and Guiding Principle 17 recommends
that businesses evaluate both actual and “potential human rights impacts.” 165 I
discuss the substance of human rights due diligence by businesses in greater detail
below but suffice it to say that an international expectation that non-state actors
themselves undertake risk assessments and seek to prevent harm reflects a
dramatic expansion in the role of risk at the international level.
The flip side is that states are also increasingly expected to assess the risk
posed by the conduct of a variety of other actors, beyond just private actors on
their territory whose conduct may have transboundary effects (that is, the question
of ‘risk by whom posed’ now has a more expansive set of answers). First, states are
supposed to evaluate the risk that other states, or armed groups with which they
may engage extraterritorially, may present. For instance, in the Genocide
Convention166 case, the ICJ held that Serbia had a due diligence obligation with
regard to the risk of genocide being perpetrated by Bosnian Serb forces, which

161

162

Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Human Rights Impact Assessments—
Resolving Key Methodological Questions, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/74 (Feb. 5, 2007).
Guiding Principles, supra note 22.

163

See John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, § I, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).

164

Guiding Principles, supra note 22, at 15–16.
Id. at 18–19.

165
166

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 183 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Genocide
Convention case].
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Serbia was then supporting.167 Perhaps even more broadly, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has recently168 adopted a new interpretation
of Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to the effect that states have an
obligation to “do everything reasonably in their power” to ensure respect for IHL
by third parties169 on the basis of risk analysis.170
A similar due diligence principle is also increasingly applied to the risks posed
by non-state actors operating around the world where they may have a territorial
link to the state but their conduct occurs principally extraterritorially, such as with
respect to terrorists, or where their link may be contractual rather than territorial,
such as with respect to private security contractors.171 Thus, for instance, there has
been considerable debate about whether to consider self-defense against non-state
actors under the rubric of attribution (in other words, a state may invoke selfdefense to respond to an attack by a non-state actor under circumstances where
that attack is attributable to the territorial state, which would require a greater

167

168

169

The court stated that this obligation “arise[s] at the instant that the State learns of, or should
normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.” Id. at ¶
431 (emphasis added).
This is a change from earlier iterations of the commentary. See, for example, Carlo Focarelli, Common
Article 1of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 134 (2010); Oona A.
Hathaway et al., supra note 98, at 28 (“These revised commentaries adopt a broader vision.”). It has
occasioned considerable debate. Cf. Oona Hathaway & Zachary Manfredi, The State Department
Adviser Signals a Middle Road on Common Article 1, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 12, 2016)
https://perma.cc/HU42-ZYGK.
See ICRC REVISED COMMENTARY, supra note 24, at 118; see also id. at 150.

170

See Knut Dormann & Jose Serralvo, Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the Obligation to
Prevent International Humanitarian Law Violations, 96 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 707, 729–30
(2014) (discussing action “where the risk of such violations can be reasonably foreseen”).
Previously, in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 104 ¶ 220
(June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua], the ICJ had focused on a negative obligation not to assist in IHL
violations. See id. (stating that the U.S. was “under an obligation not to encourage persons or groups
engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of [IHL]”) (emphasis added). By the time of
the Wall advisory opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 200 (July 9), the ICJ was speaking of
a (not defined) positive prevention obligation (it said—quite opaquely—that “all the States parties
to the [Geneva Conventions] are under an obligation . . . to ensure compliance by Israel with
international humanitarian law”). Id. at 200, ¶ 159. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 200 ¶ 159 (July
9). But even that is not equivalent to an obligation to act where there is a risk of unlawful conduct.

171

I do not engage here the question of the extraterritorial scope of human rights obligations. Compare
Oona A. Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Apply
Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 389, 390 (2011), with DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., 2014) (“The United States continues to
believe that its interpretation—that the Covenant applies only to individuals that are both within
the territory of a State Party and within its jurisdiction—is the most consistent with the Covenant’s
language and negotiating history.”) (emphasis in original).
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quantum of control by the state over the non-state actor) or under a due-diligencelike rubric (that is, a state may invoke self-defense to respond to an attack by a
non-state actor where the territorial state is unable or unwilling to address the
threat).172 The latter is increasingly the dominant paradigm,173 and turns on risk
(both with respect to expectations of conduct by the territorial state174 and the
question of when a state threatened by a non-state actor may exercise its right of
self-defense). Likewise, the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal
Obligations and Good Practices for State Related to Operations of Private
Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict provides that states have
an obligation to “take appropriate measures to prevent[ ] any violations of
international humanitarian law by personnel of [private military and security
companies].”175
With respect to this broader range of actors, risk is relevant both as
obligation and as authorization. For instance, due diligence with respect to the
conduct of an armed group on a state’s territory involves both risk as obligation
and risk as authorization (insofar as if the state is unwilling or unable to suppress
a threat, it may give rise to a right of self-defense on the part of another state on
that state’s territory176). Risks posed by these various actors may also give rise to
both procedural and substantive obligations. Thus, for instance, the Arms Trade
Treaty requires risk assessments (procedural) and prohibits transfers (substantive)

172

173

174

175

176

Risk is also increasingly relevant to questions of jus in bello. Thus, for instance, while risk (in the
sense of threat) has long been relevant under the Fourth Geneva Convention to interment
decisions, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
42(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, risk was also made relevant—whether as a
legal matter or as a policy matter—to detention of belligerents during the Obama Administration.
Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Exec. Order No. 13,567, § 2, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7,
2011).
See Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Who is on Board with “Unwilling or Unable”?, LAWFARE (Oct. 10,
2016), https://perma.cc/RG33-D4GZ. But see Kevin Jon Heller, The Absence of Practice Supporting the
“Unwilling or Unable” Test, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/TNQ7-LZ7D.
See, for example, Vincent-Joel Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly Liable for Failing to
Prevent Transborder Attacks, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 615, 652–53 (2005) (discussing strict liability
with a due diligence defense).
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE MONTREUX DOCUMENT ON PERTINENT
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND GOOD PRACTICES FOR STATE RELATED TO
OPERATIONS OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES DURING ARMED CONFLICT 11, ¶ 3
(2009) https://perma.cc/ZNK2-L9ZP [hereinafter MONTREUX DOCUMENT].
The “unwilling or unable” test speaks to the question of whether the use of force is lawful on the
territory of a particular state. The antecedent question of whether force may lawfully be used against a
particular armed group turns on (among other factors) whether that armed group has attacked the
state wishing to use force (or whether there is an imminent threat of such an attack).
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under certain circumstances.177 And finally, risk may be assessed contextually or
categorically. Consider the question of whether certain activities of private security
contractors are inherently risky178 or whether certain business conduct should be
likewise so considered (such as transactions involving minerals from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo).179

2. New Harm
The second expansion is that a risk-based approach is also increasingly being
applied to non-physical, territorially-diffuse harms. For instance, a large number
of commentators have begun suggesting that due diligence norms be applied to
cyberspace.180 While in some cases, cyber activity could produce physical effects
that would bring cyber within the realm of what the ILC historically focused
upon,181 in many cases cyber activities would not have such effects.182 Moreover,
cyber activities also pose challenging questions of geography insofar as their
effects may not be transboundary (meaning crossing a border shared by two
states) (and cyber activities may transit the territory of uninvolved states).183
This concept of due diligence with respect to cyber activities is increasingly
risk-oriented. The Cybercrime Convention reflects a traditional approach to
deterring the use of a state’s territory for malicious activities (harkening back to
the earlier concept of due diligence)—that is, a requirement to criminalize.184 But

177

178

179

180
181
182
183

184

See Arms Trade Treaty, G.A. Res. 67/234 B arts. 7(1)(b)(i), 7(3), Apr. 2, 2013,
https://perma.cc/48KT-H4XV. The Arms Trade Treaty explicitly goes beyond the doctrine of
state responsibility. Alexandra Boivin, Complicity and Beyond: International Law and the Transfer of Small
Arms and Light Weapons, 87 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 467, 469, 493 (2005).
MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 175, at 11, ¶ 2 (suggesting that states when contracting should
“tak[e] into account the inherent risk associated with the services to be performed”).
See, for example, S.C. Res. 1857, ¶ 15 (Dec. 22, 2008); see also Final Rep. of the Group of Experts on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶¶ 306, 308, U.N. Doc. S/2010/596 (Nov. 29, 2010) (discussing “red
flag” locations). Cf. OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF
MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH RISK AREAS, ANNEX I 18 (2d ed. 2013)
(discussing specific-mineral-based risk analyses).
See generally note 23, supra, collecting sources.
Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, supra note 23, at 75.
Walton, supra note 23, at 1472–73.
Scott J. Shackelford et al., Unpacking the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the
Public and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (2016) (distinguishing Trail Smelter as it involved a
“geographical constraint”).
Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Response to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active
Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 64 (2009) (“[It]
demonstrates state recognition of both the need to criminalize cyberattacks, and the duty of states
to prevent their territory from being used by non-state actors to conduct cyberattacks against other
states.”).
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an obligation to prosecute—standing alone—may be insufficient.185 Thus,
scholars are increasingly focused on strictly preventative measures, such as riskevaluation procedures186 and notice and consultation provisions.187 And, Beatrice
Walton has proposed to import the ILC’s concept of liability for transboundary
harm to the world of low-intensity cyber conduct.188
Nor is the debate confined to cyber activities. Some, for instance, have
sought to apply due diligence norms to the development and potential deployment
of autonomous weapons systems, seeking to analogize to the due diligence
standard applicable to ultra-hazardous environmental activities.189

B. Enhanced Obligations and Particularized Risk
In this Section, I make the case that risk has not just propagated to other
actors and other topics, but it is increasingly reticulated. That is, obligations that
were uncertain (and in particular procedural obligations) have been firmed up; and
areas of law that had a risk element have begun to require more detailed risk
analyses.

1. Deeper Acceptance of Risk
The first development has been the clarification of uncertain risk-based
obligations. While in 2003, Xue Hanqin stated that “it is questionable whether [a
duty to undertake environmental impact assessments] can be claimed on the basis
of customary international law,”190 matters have advanced considerably since
185

Id. at 9 (“[D]espite Chinese and Russian pledges to crackdown on their attackers, no one has been
brought to justice for any of the attacks discussed.”).

186

Ziolkowski, supra note 23, at 169; Ortner, supra note 23, at 208 (“[T]he government should
independently seek to measure and evaluate its progress by conducting impact assessments.”); see
also Benedikt Pirker, Territorial Sovereignty and Integrity and the Challenges of Cyberspace, in PEACETIME
REGIME, supra note 23, at 189, 208 (asserting that there “may be a certain minimum standard of
control over cyber activities that needs to be respected”). But see TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 23,
at 44–45; Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, supra note 23 (“[T]here was no agreement
as to whether the due diligence obligation applies when a state knows that such activities will be
launched but they have not yet materialized.”). For an interesting recent development, see Kristen
Eichensehr, Would the United States be Responsible for Private Hacking, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/QZD8-HR2B (discussing voluntary review by the U.S. government of proposed
cyber actions and the consequences thereof).
Jason Healey & Hannah Pitts, Applying International Environmental Legal Norms to Cyber Statecraft, 8
I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 356, 376 (2012).
Walton, supra note 23, at 1465 (suggesting “applying this liability approach to low-intensity statesponsored cyber attack”).
Nehal Bhuta & Stavros-Evdokimos Pantazopoulous, Autonomy and Uncertainty: Increasingly
Autonomous Weapons Systems and the International Legal Regulation of Risk, in AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
SYSTEMS: LAW, ETHICS, POLICY at 284, 291 (Nehal Bhuta et al. eds., 2016).

187

188

189

190

HANQIN, supra note 111, at 167.
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then.191 Indeed, in two recent decisions of the ICJ and a decision of the Seabed
Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS, tribunals have asserted such an obligation.192
Not only have the ICJ and ITLOS suggested that environmental impact
assessments should be seen as on a sturdier footing,193 they have also given some
guidance regarding when in their view such assessments are required, beginning
the work of identifying the level of risk that necessitates more careful scrutiny,194
which has further contributed to the firming up of what the ICJ has said is an
obligation.195 In Certain Activities and Construction of a Road, the court examined “the
nature and magnitude of the project and the context in which it was to be carried
out” and concluded that there was a sufficient risk that Costa Rica should have
carried out an environmental impact assessment.196 Litigation between Malaysia
and Singapore before ITLOS also yielded useful practice on bilateral
environmental factfinding,197 especially as prompted by an ITLOS provisional
measures order.198 Finally, the South China Sea arbitral award glossed Article 206
of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in evaluating whether China had
191

Moreover, instruments requiring or purporting to require EIAs continue to proliferate. The 2008
Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, like the Watercourses Convention, provides
that states shall share “available technical data and information, including any environmental impact
assessment,” where “planned activities . . . may affect a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system
and thereby may have a significant adverse effect upon another State.” Draft Articles on the Law of
Transboundary Aquifers, with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 65 (2008).

192

See supra note 17. The ICJ has been somewhat unclear whether in its view the requirement of an
EIA derives from states’ due diligence obligations or is free-standing. Compare Nicar. v. Costa Rica,
2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665, ¶¶ 18–22 (separate opinion of Owada, J.), and Nicar. v. Costa Rica, 2015 I.C.J.
Rep. 665, ¶ 9 (separate opinion of Donoghue, J.), with Nicar. v. Costa Rica, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665, ¶
9 (separate opinion of Dugard, J.). The Seabed Disputes Chamber has been much clearer.
Responsibilities and Obligations of States, Advisory Opinion, supra, ¶ 145 (“It should be stressed
that the obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment is a . . . general obligation under
customary international law.”).

193

I take no position on the substantive question of whether environmental impact assessments are
required by customary or general international law, and, if so, why. My point here is descriptive.

194

Under corollary U.S. law, the first question an agency must address is whether the risk of affecting
the environment is sufficient to require an environmental impact statement in the first place (if not,
the federal agency issues a finding of no significant impact). See, for example, Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t
of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

195

This kind of guidance is significant in light of the differences John Knox has identified at the
domestic level regarding how states undertake EIAs. John H. Knox, Assessing the Candidates for a
Global Treaty on Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 153, 156–57
(2003).

196

Nicar. v. Costa Rica, supra note 17, at 720–21, ¶ 155. Cf. id. at 707, ¶ 105 (concluding that Nicaragua
was not required to carry out an EIA).

197

FOSTER, supra note 129, at 36 (describing the case as representing “a high-water mark in the cooperative settlement of international disputes involving scientific uncertainty”).

198

Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor, supra note 151, at ¶ 106.
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in fact carried out an EIA.199 One commentator has argued that the Panel’s
emphasis on the importance of a “comprehensive” assessment provides
important guidance.200

2. Risk Specificity
The second development has been that even where risk had previously been
relevant, the expectation is now that a harder look will be taken at particular risks,
in both categorical and contextual analyses.201 This can most clearly be seen in the
context of human rights due diligence, both by states and by corporations.
Human rights due diligence has principally developed through instruments
and international case law regarding violence against women.202 Early on, the focus
was on having the appropriate laws203 and on the need to investigate potential
abuses.204 This paralleled the way due diligence was conceived with respect to the
199

The South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award of Jul. 12, 2016,
¶ 989 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).

200

Makane Moise Mbengue, The South China Sea Arbitration: Innovations in Marine Environmental FactFinding and Due Diligence Obligations, 110 A.J.I.L. UNBOUND 285, 286–87 (2016).

201

By this I mean that specific risks are identified, which could be presented either by a category of
activities or a specific act.

202

Most trace these developments to the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29,
1988), although a case involving disappearances not domestic violence, in which the court held that
“[t]he State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use
the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its
jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the
victim adequate compensation.” Id. at ¶ 174. For the relationship between subsequent jurisprudence
on domestic violence and this case, see, for example, Patricia Tarre Moser, The Duty to Ensure Human
Rights and Its Evolution in the Inter-American System: Comparing Maria Da Penha v. Brazil with Lenahan
(Gonzales) v. United States, 21 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 437 (2012). The Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (the CEDAW Committee) also relied on this
logic in adopting its General Recommendation 19. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women,
supra note 35, at ¶ 24(a). The U.S. has expressed some skepticism regarding the scope of due
diligence obligations, see Lenahan v. United States, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 80/11 ¶ 3 (Aug. 17, 2011) (“The State moreover claims that the petitioners cite no provision
of the American Declaration that imposes on the United States an affirmative duty, such as the
exercise of due diligence.”), and I take no position on the merits of their view as my argument here
is descriptive.
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 202, at ¶ 175 (“This duty to prevent includes all those
means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human
rights and ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts.”). For instance, the
CEDAW Committee specifically recommended certain forms of legislation, such as making
available the equivalent of restraining orders. General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 35, at
¶ 24(t)(ii).
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 202, at ¶ 176 (“The State is obligated to investigate every
situation involving a violation of the rights protected by the Convention.”); Declaration on the

203

204
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protection of foreign nationals. As the then-Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women said, “the application of the due diligence standard, to date, has
. . . [been] limited to responding to violence when it occurs, largely neglecting the
obligation to prevent . . . .”205 Likewise, one commentator contrasted the InterAmerican Commission’s recent casework with earlier cases, saying that the latter
“only explored how the lack of an official investigation violated the victim’s right
to judicial remedy and to a fair trial . . . [and not] the State’s obligation to prevent
the severe domestic violence.”206
More recently, however, the focus has truly turned to preventing risk, including
by analyzing risk more closely. Thus, a 2005 Council of Europe recommendation
requested states to “ensure that measures are taken to protect victims effectively
against threats and possible acts of revenge.”207 The recommendation went beyond
earlier recommendations regarding legislation and gave specificity to calls for the
availability of restraining orders, suggesting “enabl[ing] the judiciary to
adopt . . . interim measures aimed at protecting the victims, the banning of a
perpetrator from contacting, communicating with or approaching the victim,
residing in or entering defined areas.”208 Most recently, the Council of Europe
adopted a convention on violence against women and domestic violence that
includes specific preventive obligations,209 predicated upon risk assessments.210
Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights has recently begun to take this
Elimination of Violence against Women art. 4(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993)
(“[P]revent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against
women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons.”); Inter-American
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, supra
note 35, at art. 7(b) (“[A]pply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence
against women”). Thus in the Maria da Pehna Maia Fernandes case, Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes
v. Brazil, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54/01, (Apr. 16, 2001), before the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, the question was whether the state was responsible for
having condoned domestic violence under circumstances where “for more than 15 years, it has
failed to take the effective measures required to prosecute and punish the aggressor, despite
repeated complaints.” Id. at ¶ 2; see also id. at ¶ 44 (“The Commission holds the view that the
domestic judicial decisions in this case reveal inefficiency, negligence, and failure to act on the part
of the Brazilian judicial authorities and unjustified delay in the prosecution of the accused.”).
205

Yakin Ertürk (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women), The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool
for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006).

206

Moser, supra note 202, at 438.
Eur. Consult. Ass’n, Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States
on the Protection of Women Against Violence app. ¶ 44, 794th Sess. (Apr. 30, 2002) (emphasis
added).

207

208
209

210

Id. at ¶ 58(b).
Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and
Domestic Violence art. 5(2), Apr. 7, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 210.
Id. at art. 51(1). This is an emerging field at the domestic level. See generally, for example, Jacquelyn C.
Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide, 250 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 14 (2003).
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approach211 in, for instance, Opuz v. Turkey.212 While Opuz applied an attribution
test turning on knowledge, as Cheryl Hanna has put it, “Opuz provides a useful
starting point for framing the affirmative duty to undertake a risk assessment in
all cases made known to state authorities.”213 Courts and other bodies have also
focused recently on the specifics of laws regarding restraining orders,214 which in
effect reflect judicial judgments regarding risk.215 As one commentator has put it,
the “evolution in case law . . . [has been moving toward] the theory of foreseeable
risk.”216
With respect to corporate human rights due diligence, while the concept is
new, and therefore this is not an evolution, the expectation has been similar: that
corporations will look at very particular risks. The concept of corporate human
rights due diligence has been shaped by analogous domestic law,217 which is
211

For very useful surveys of this jurisprudence, see generally Lee Hassselbacher, State Obligations
Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of Human Rights, Due Diligence, and International Legal
Minimums of Protection, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 190 (2009) and Benedetta Faedi Duramy, Judicial
Developments in the Application of International Law to Domestic Violence, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 413 (2012).

212

Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 144.
Cheryl Hanna, Health, Human Rights, and Violence Against Women and Girls: Broadly Redefining Affirmative
State Duties after Opuz v. Turkey, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 145 (2011).
In Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 71127/01, ¶ 83 (2008), for instance, the European
Court suggested that the preventive measures set forth in the Council of Europe’s recommendation
might be required. (“[T]he Court considers that certain administrative and policing measures—
among them, for example, those mentioned in Recommendation Rec(2002)5 . . . would have been
called for.”). And in A.T. v. Hungary, CEDAW Comm., No. 2/2003, ¶ 2.1, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (2005), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women considered an allegation that Hungary had inadequate preventive measures because there
were “no protection orders or restraining orders available under Hungarian law.”
Lenahan v. United States, supra note 202, at ¶ 145 (noting “judicial recognition of risk”).

213

214

215
216

217

Moser, supra note 202, at 439; see also Rashida Manjoo (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, ¶¶ 70–71,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/49 (May 4, 2013) (suggesting that it might be useful to distinguish
“systemic” due diligence from “individual” due diligence). This way of approaching due diligence
stands in some contrast to the earlier jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which
tended not to look deeply into how domestic authorities considered risk on the front end; see Osman
v. U.K., Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 116 (Oct. 28, 1998) (explaining that the “obligation must [not]
be interpreted in a way which . . . impose[s] an impossible or disproportionate burden on the
authorities.”).
See, for example, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7,
2008) (“Comparable processes are typically already embedded in companies because in many
countries they are legally required to have information and control systems in place to assess and
manage financial and related risks.”); Mark B. Taylor et al., Due Diligence for Human Rights: A Risk
Based Approach at 2 (Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 53, 2009),
https://perma.cc/ZT6W-YZEP; Olga Martin-Ortega, Human Rights Due Diligence for Corporations:
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decidedly specific. 218 And, this concept of specific due diligence has been
replicated at the international level.219 Indeed, one prominent report seeking to
gloss due diligence under the U.N. Guiding Principles has specifically argued that
“an investigative process must be undertaken for the purpose of preventing
harm,”220 including such specific measures as field visits under certain
circumstances.221 The same has been true of recent OECD work on the subject.222

V. R EASONS FOR R ISK ’ S R ISE AND C ONSEQUENCES T HEREOF
A. Why Risk?
In this Section, I seek to offer potential reasons for the trend I have sought
to identify. I offer six such potential reasons. First, as I have sought to show, riskbased obligations may be (and often are) procedural (e.g., a requirement to
undertake an environmental impact assessment); if substantive, the obligation is
From Voluntary Standards to Hard Law at Last?, 32 NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS. 44, 51 (2014) (“[Ruggie]
translated the due diligence that companies were accustomed to performing in commercial relations
and transactions into the sphere of human rights.”); Robert McCorquodale, Social Responsibility and
International Human Rights Law, 87 J. BUS. OF ETHICS 385, 392 (2009) (“This concept of due diligence
appears to be an integration of the human rights obligation . . . and the general business practice of
due diligence.”); ILA Study Group, First Report, supra note 29, at 20 (“This appears to be an integration
of the international human rights legal obligation of due diligence . . . and the general voluntary
business practice of due diligence.”).
218

219

220
221
222

Take due diligence in the context of the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA). The Department of
Justice and Securities Exchange Commission have indicated they will consider the existence and
extent of compliance programs in deciding what cases to pursue. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
AND SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 56 (Nov. 14, 2012), https://perma.cc/7SJG-QXTR [hereinafter FCPA RESOURCE
GUIDE] (“DOJ and SEC also consider the adequacy of a company’s compliance program when
deciding what, if any, action to take.”). Compliance programs are risk based. FCPA RESOURCE
GUIDE, supra, at 58 (“Assessment of risk is fundamental to developing a strong compliance
program”). Indeed, under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, an effective compliance program is
defined as one where the corporation “exercise[s] due diligence to prevent and detect criminal
conduct.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES Chapter 8 § 8B2.1(a)(1). Specifically, for a program to be
deemed effective “the organization [is expected] periodically [to] assess the risk of criminal
conduct.” Id. at § 8B2.1(c). And DOJ and SEC assert that “each compliance program should be
tailored to an organization’s specific needs, risks, and challenges.” FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra,
at 57.
Martin-Ortega, supra note 217, at 56–57 (stating that it includes “the flexibility of the concept
according to size and activity”).
Taylor et al., supra note 217, at 2.
Id. at 11–12.
See, for example, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendation of the
Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Annex
II, § A(6) (Nov. 26, 2009); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises, at 47 (2011).
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usually one of conduct and not of result (e.g., due diligence). These kinds of
obligations are attractive because they permit meaningful legal development
without being overly prescriptive. Consider for instance the Security Council
resolutions on the DPRK. A requirement to prohibit transactions that are likely
to benefit the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs is a useful
compromise between states with different perspectives: Those states that wish to
further constrain the DPRK are able to make incremental progress (insofar as
such a provision provides a hook to lobby other states regarding pending
transactions with a view to getting them to prohibit them and, in some cases, may
provide a domestic legal basis for those states to act); at the same time, such a
provision leaves a margin of discretion for states that may be less willing to take
significant steps (to the extent those states are prepared to argue that risky
transactions are not sufficiently likely to benefit the DPRK’s prohibited programs
as to come within the ambit of the resolution). Likewise, where risk plays a role in
authorization, it tends to be self-judging, which is appealing to states, especially in
the national security space.
Lest this appear too cynical an account, risk can also permit states to
“legalize” desirable caution (along the lines of the precautionary approach, but
also more broadly). Take, for example, recent developments with respect to
proportionality and precautions in the conduct of hostilities. Scholars have
increasingly asserted the importance of robust assessments of the risk of civilian
casualties223 and the Obama administration issued presidential policy guidance
(what one commentator has called “folk law”224), which required that “direct
action will be taken only if there is near certainty that the action can be taken
without injuring or killing non-combatants.”225 Moreover, whatever one thinks of
precaution, it is undoubtedly true that traditional treaty-making may be an
imperfect fit for situations where our collective understanding of the problem is
223

Geoffrey Corn, War, Law, and Oft Overlooked Value of Process as a Precautionary Measure, 42 PEPP. L.
REV. 419, 455 (2015) (“[T]he scope of intelligence collection and analysis must be understood to
include a continuing obligation to assess civilian considerations of the military operation in order
to facilitate the commander’s assessment of civilian risk associated with targeting decisions.”);
Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 745 (2014) (“Perhaps the
simplest way to understand the mitigation process is to think of it as a series of tests based on
risk.”). That precautions in attack involves risk assessment is not of course new, see, for example,
MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE
TWO 1997 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 363 (1982), but it
has gained increased salience.

224

See generally Naz K. Modirzadeh, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transformation of the
Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance, 5 HARV. NAT’L
SEC. J. 225 (2014).
See Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and
Areas of Active Hostilities (May 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/N53N-NWJH.
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subject to rapid change.226 Thus, risk assessment, which is a static principle with
dynamic output based on probabilities, may be useful. The bottom line is that risk
can be very helpful to policymaking insofar as it can facilitate solving a variety of
problems that require carefully calibrated responses.
A second potential reason for the rise of risk may be related to a broader
shift toward ex ante compliance rather than ex post reparation (a shift described in
part above as well). As Dinah Shelton has pointed out, “[b]reach[es] [today are]
unlikely to injure another state directly or give rise to a classic claim for
reparations.”227 Part and parcel with this change in the nature of disputes, as she
argues, is that we tend increasingly to see ex ante compliance mechanisms.228 Risk
fits neatly within that paradigm, both because risk (assessed ex ante) helps to
identify situations where non-compliance may occur (before it does) and because
it can be harnessed to the broader array of modes of compliance that different
bodies are now pioneering (as opposed to more traditional inter-state litigation
after the fact). More broadly, at the domestic level, the increasing use of risk
assessments has characterized the rise of modern administration, and there is a
colorable argument that states are increasingly acting as regulators at the
international level (whether through international organizations229 or simply by
virtue of the extraterritorial effects that their decisions may have). On this account,
risk analysis is increasing because of the kinds of decisions states are now taking,
which may also lend themselves to risk analysis.230
Third, a risk-based approach accounts for the multiplicity of actors relevant
to international decision-making, both actors potentially involved in causing harm
and actors who may be victims of harm. Risk-based norms, of course, better
account for the potential harms caused by non-state actors than do stateattribution rules; risk also has a flexible aperture and is readily susceptible to being
widened to capture as many or as few as may be desired with respect to the
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227

228
229

230

FOSTER, supra note 129, at 9 (discussing the “difficulty with keeping international standards up to
date with scientific developments”); David A. Wirth, Examining Decision-Making Processes in
International Environmental law, 79 IOWA L. REV. 769, 792 (1994) (“Unfortunately, the fit between the
law and many environmental problems is poor [because] [s]cientific knowledge . . . can change
rapidly.”).
Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833,
834 (2002).
Id. at 854–55.
Cf. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE
L.J. 1490, 1494 (2006) (analogizing views of international organization policy-making to “suspicions
that accompanied the founding of the American administrative state”).
See, for example, Proulx, supra note 174, at 644 (“The global effort against terrorism is an exercise in
risk assessment.”).
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question of whose exposure to risk is relevant.231 In a world where
“interdependence . . . has become painfully evident,”232 risk may play a useful role
in calibrating the scope of a state’s response to a particular issue. (In fact, the
concept of adaptive management, pioneered in environmental law but susceptible
of application elsewhere, presupposes that risk assessments may change over time
and contemplates a continual process of adjustments.233)
Fourth, a risk-based approach also can facilitate engagement by a broader
array of actors with respect to state conduct. Smaller states and civil society are
increasingly clamoring to have their voices heard. Thus, for instance, Micronesia
recently sought an environmental impact statement from the Czech Republic, 234
and civil society is heavily engaged on numerous issues, such as participating in
the governance of mechanisms for evaluating and assessing risk presented by
particular forms of corporate conduct.235 Risk-based analysis may facilitate such
participation. To the extent it is procedural or turns on expertise, states may more
readily heed outside inputs. This has certainly been the experience of international
environmental law. (To give one example, the Aarhus Convention Compliance
Committee has suggested that foreign nationals should be permitted to engage a
state’s domestic environmental decision-making.236 And as one commentator has
put it, it is undoubtedly the case that “procedure serves to enable, guide and at
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Cf. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders,
107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 317 (2013) (“[C]ontemporary circumstances . . . require the recognition of
a fundamental legal obligation upon sovereigns to note the interests of others when making policy
choices that directly affect them.”).
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Esty, supra note 229, at 1493.
See, for example, Cooney & Lang, supra note 13, at 534.
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236

Jutta Brunée, International Environmental Law and Community Interests: Procedural Aspects 13, in
COMMUNITY OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Eval Benvenisti & Georg Nolte eds.,
forthcoming 2017).
See, for example, Articles of Association, International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’
Association art. 3.3.3, INT’L CODE OF CONDUCT ASSC’N, https://perma.cc/Q8YZ-BMDJ (last visited
Oct. 9, 2017); Voluntary Principles Initiative—Guidance on Certain Role [sic] and Responsibilities of NGOs,
VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES, https://perma.cc/EEP4-RJNE (last visited Oct. 9, 2017); see also Articles
of Association, supra, at art. 11, (permitting ICOCA to certify companies); International Code of Conduct
for Private Security Service Providers ¶ 6(d), INT’L CODE OF CONDUCT ASSC’N, https://perma.cc/95CHRVGJ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (discussing “deter[ing]” abuses); Voluntary Principles on Security and
Human Rights, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES, https://perma.cc/8BXH-F5QU (last visited Oct. 9, 2017)
(discussing “accurate, effective risk assessments”).
Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Compliance Committee, Report
on the Seventh Meeting, Addendum, ¶ 28, UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2005/2/Add.3 (Mar. 14,
2005); see also Rio Declaration, supra note 21, at 5, Principle 10 (“States shall facilitate and encourage
public awareness and participation.”).
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times even compel interaction between states and other international actors,
including non-state actors.”237)
There are a number of reasons why the tandem of risk assessment and
greater engagement by outside actors may be appealing for states. “Recent work
on the legitimacy of international institutions has highlighted the importance of
‘input legitimacy,’ as well as ‘output legitimacy.’”238 Engagement by non-traditional
actors may also produce better results.239 In this regard, many of the arguments
made regarding civil society engagement with “global governance” institutions
obtain here, too, in that state action increasingly affects a range of actors that the
acting state may not represent.240
Fifth, states and other actors have access to much greater amounts of data
and may feel confidence in making decisions on the basis of risks they discern
from that data. The impact of (and potential hidden problems with) “Big Data”
have been discussed in a variety of domestic law areas, from anti-discrimination
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238

Brunée, supra note 234, at 7; see also David Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
595, 616–17 (2010) (“[T]here is an important literature on global administrative law, which focuses
on the role of procedural requirements within international institutions as a means to improving
[sic] responsiveness and accountability.”).
Gartner, supra note 237, at 604; see also Kal Raustiala, Note, The ‘Participatory Revolution’ in International
Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 539 (1997) (“NGO participation does not
undermine but rather strengthens the regulatory powers of states and the state system. The benefits
states accrue from NGO participation allow them to regulate ecologically harmful activities with
greater efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy.”) (emphasis in original). Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle,
657 F.2d 298, 400–01 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[T]he very legitimacy of general policymaking performed
by unelected administrators depends in no small part upon the openness, accessibility, and
amenability of these officials to the needs and ideas of the public.”); The Idea of Risk Characterization,
in UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 10, at 24 (“The instrumental rationale for broad public
participation is that it may decrease conflict and increase acceptance of or trust in decisions by
government.”).
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Wirth, supra note 226, at 770 (“[P]ublic participation in defining, implementing, and applying
international environmental law can facilitate the twin goals of accountability and efficacy.”);
Raustiala, supra note 238, at 557 (“Th[e] growth in the complexity, scope, and regulatory nature of
international environmental law has fostered the expansion of private sector participation . . .
[including] [b]ecause non-state actors frequently possess better (and different) information than
governments.”). Cf. Summary, in UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 10, at 4 (“[A]lthough potentially
more time-consuming and cumbersome in the near term, it is often wiser to err on the side of toobroad rather than too-narrow participation.”).
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Daniel M. Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 606 (1999). For instance, NGOs can act as compliance
monitors, which creates a legitimacy feedback loop. See Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental
Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 355 (2006) (asserting that NGOs “supply
the personnel and resources for managing compliance that states have become increasingly
reluctant to provide”) (quoting ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 250–51 (1995)).

Winter 2018

641

Chicago Journal of International Law

law241 to policing.242 But states may nevertheless feel like they can harness data to
make better-informed decisions at the international level.243 The first turn to risk
was prompted by technology244 and risk analysis lends itself to reliance on data
because it is essentially an exercise in forecasting. Moreover, grounding a claim in
empiricism can amplify its perceived legitimacy. For many, decisions based on
data are inherently more trustworthy than those predicated upon other factors,
because an empirical approach (it is argued) screens out politics and other
preferences that might reduce the likelihood of the “right” decision being taken.245
Indeed, some have argued that risk-based action can help to address a legitimacy
deficit in international law for this reason.246 And “concepts of ‘threats’ and ‘risk’
have become closely associated with scientific knowledge.”247
Sixth, use of risk assessments may create greater vertical congruence—that
is, between domestic and international approaches. As David Wirth has noted, the
“‘internationalization’ of environmental law . . . raised expectations of congruence
between the international system and national decision-making procedures.”248
The uptake of environmental impact assessments from the national to the
international level is a good example of this phenomenon.249 But the vector can
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See, for example, Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671
(2016).
See, for example, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 327 (2015).
Cf. Annecoos Wiersema, Uncertainty, Precaution and Adaptive Management in Wildlife Trade, 36 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 375, 418 (2015) (“[E]nough data can give rise to sufficient levels of certainty to inform
decisions using modeling and extrapolations.”).
Report of the Working Group on International Liability, supra note 114, at 150 (“A revolution in technology
. . . has extended dramatically man’s power to control his environment, creating a corresponding
need for the urgent development of legal norms.”).
But cf. Judgment in the Risk Decision Process, in UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 10, at 39 (“Individuals
and groups that do not share the judgments and assumptions about the problem formulation that
underlie a risk characterization may well see the information it provides as invalid, illegitimate, or
not pertinent.”); PEEL, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE, supra note 21, at 65 (“[T]here
may be a divergence in the way risks are perceived between ‘experts’ and the ‘lay public.’”); Vern R.
Walker, The Myth of Science as a ‘Neutral Arbiter’ for Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 197, 198 (2003) (making “a risk determination cannot be a matter of ‘pure science’”).
PEEL, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE, supra note 21, at 48–50.
Id. at 65.
Wirth, supra note 226, at 770.
See, for example, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 118, at 158 (“The legal
obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment under national law was first developed
in the United States.”); NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT: PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 23 (2008) (“EIA norms have not only
spread horizontally to other states, but they have also spread vertically, influencing the development
of EIA norms in international law and within international organizations.”); Charles M. Kersten,
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go both ways. Thus, for instance, the regulations implementing the Dodd-Frank
provisions on conflict minerals required that companies follow a nationally or
internationally recognized due diligence framework, and the OECD’s Due
Diligence Guidance was deemed to satisfy this.250

B. Is Risk Risky?
While the prior Section highlighted potential reasons (many of them salutary)
for risk’s rise, in this Section, I explore ways in which risk may not be an unalloyed
good. To that end, I offer a preliminary assessment of the consequences of the
increasing use of risk in international law. At least two sets of questions can be
asked: (1) how risk-based decisions can be and are reviewed; and (2) whether risk
analysis promotes horizontal harmonization or fragmentation.
The first consequence of the rise of risk is the corollary to a number of the
reasons I have adduced for why it has occurred—that is, while risk-based
decisions may be easier for external actors to shape, and may have (or be perceived
to have) a certain objectivity to the extent decisions are predicated upon
assessments of risk (or based on empirics), they may also be less susceptible to
judicial review. For one thing, courts tend to be more deferential with respect to
procedural law than they are with respect to substantive law.251 Moreover,
empirical claims regarding risk are fundamentally difficult to adjudicate. Consider
for instance the long-standing and thorny domestic law conversation about how
to analyze risks under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 252
including in particular high-impact, low-probability events,253 or the way courts
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Note, Rethinking Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 34 YALE. J. INT’L L. 173, 173 (2009)
(“The theory of EIA emerged in the domestic context.”).
Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249(b) (2012) (“The OECD’s ‘Due Diligence
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas’
satisfies our criteria and may be used as a framework for purposes of satisfying the final rule’s
requirement that an issuer exercise due diligence in determining the source and chain of custody of
its conflict minerals.”); see also Martin-Ortega, supra note 217, at 66.
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Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978) (“[I]f
courts continually review agency proceedings to determine whether the agency employed
procedures which were, in the court's opinion, perfectly tailored to reach what the court perceives
to be the ‘best’ or ‘correct’ result, judicial review would be totally unpredictable.”).
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National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969).
See, for example, Carla Mattix & Kathleen Becker, Scientific Uncertainty Under the National Environmental
Policy Act, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1133, 1142 (2002); Irene Weintraub, Note, NEPA and Uncertainty
in Low Impact, High Risk Scenarios: Nuclear Energy as a Case Study, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1565, 1567–
68 (2016) (“[C]ourts have continued to interpret NEPA’s requirements in areas of uncertainty in
different ways.”); Michael Hill, Note, NEPA at the Limits of Risk Assessment: Whether to Discuss a
Potential Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear Power Plant Under the National Environment Policy Act, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3007, 3025–28 (2010). Indeed, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) initially
required federal agencies to take a “worst-case” approach, before subsequently revising its
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have struggled with scientific evidence. As Robert McCorquodale has asserted
with respect to one risk-based area at the international level, “it is difficult to
establish a clear standard of business due diligence that is adjudicated by dispute
settlement bodies.”254 A further difficulty is that science, which underlies many
risk claims, changes quickly, but judgments do not—that is, even if one were able
to obtain reliable judgments, would one really want to revisit them every few years
if the underpinnings have fallen away?255
These difficulties are compounded before international bodies that tend to
be less experienced with—and may have fewer authorities to engage in—rigorous
factfinding, which in turn may be necessary for a true evaluation of a risk-based
claim.256 Thus, for instance, while there have been some recent positive examples
of judicial engagement with scientific questions,257 the ICJ’s treatment of science
in the Pulp Mills and Certain Activities and Construction of a Road cases has been
roundly criticized. For instance, in Pulp Mills, the court considered an argument
that Uruguay was not required to consider remote risks258 and did appear not to
delve deeply into certain evidentiary questions.259 Sophie Schiettekatte has
summarized that the “ICJ [was] heavily criticized for its deference when it comes
to evidence of a highly scientific or technical matters [sic] . . . .” 260 Even in the
ICJ’s recent decision in the Certain Activities and Construction of a Road cases, which
marked a certain amount of progress in my view, Judge ad hoc Dugard expressed
regulation in favor of analysis of “reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts.” Todd S.
Aagaard, A Functional Approach to Risks and Uncertainties Under NEPA, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN.
L. 87, 97 (2012); Charles F. Weiss, Note, Federal Agency Treatment of Uncertainty in Environmental Impact
Assessments Under the CEQ’s Amended NEPA Regulation § 1502.22: Worst Case Analysis or Risk
Threshold, 86 MICH. L. REV. 777, 778 (1988). Compare 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (1979), with 40 C.F.R. §
1502.22(b).
254

Robert McCorquodale, Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human Rights Law, 87 J. BUS.
ETHICS 385, 392 (2009).
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Cf. FOSTER, supra note 129, at 317.
Some states may even take the view that scientific disputes are non-justiciable at international law.
See Southern Bluefin Tuna (N. Z. v. Japan, Austl. v. Japan), 23 R.I.A.A. 1, 28 (2006) (“questions of
scientific judgment . . . are not justiciable.”); see also JAMES GERARD DEVANEY, FACT-FINDING
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 74 (2016).
Some have cited the South China Sea arbitration as a model. See, for example, Sophie Schiettekatte,
Building the Bridge Between Science and Law at the International Court of Justice: From Ex Parte to Ex Curia
Experts at 9 (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 9), https://perma.cc/5BDN-MJUG; Mbengue,
supra note 200, at 287; see generally FOSTER, supra note 129, at 131 (asserting that there are a “diversity
of procedures” now used by courts and tribunals to undertake scientific fact-finding).
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Arg. v. Uru., supra note 17, at ¶ 203.
Id. at 86 ¶ 213; see also id. at ¶ 6 (Yusuf, J., concurring); Schiettekatte, supra note 257, at 7. Cf. Arg. v.
Uru., supra note 17, at 111, ¶ 6 (Al-Khasawneh J. & Simma J., dissenting). For criticism of the ICJ
for failing to articulate standards to guide EIAs, see Plakokefalos, supra note 34, at 14–15.
Schiettekatte, supra note 257, at 3.
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concerns261 and Diane Desierto argued that “the Court ultimately remained
opaque on the method and criteria it used to assess the degree of ‘risk of
transboundary harm’ that would be sufficient to trigger a State’s obligation to
conduct an EIA.”262 Moreover, while in theory a ‘public accountability’
mechanism could be effective at the international level, there are significant
differences between NEPA practice in the U.S. and international decision-making.
For one thing, the Aarhus Convention notwithstanding, those across a border
who are affected by potential decisions may have few rights to intervene.263
Second, risk-based law may be unevenly applied, both as a matter of
principle and as a matter of practice. This may or may not be a good thing. For
instance, risk-based law tends to distinguish between states based on their capacity
to detect risk.264 Such differentiation would in the case of human rights, for
example, be problematic. Moreover, to the extent that risk assessments disguise
underlying value judgments,265 risk-based law may polarize states. Further, the risk
threshold remains substantially uncertain. Consider for instance the many
standards for when to apply a precautionary approach, ranging from “reasonable
scientific plausibility” to “credible” to “non-negligible.”266
States may also simply judge risk in specific cases differently and risk may be
a vehicle for biases and exaggerations. Thus, for instance, any number of the
disputes to which I have referred in this Article evidence that states may reach
different conclusions regarding risk (e.g., whether Japanese fishing plans were
hazardous to bluefin tuna stocks). There are also many ways to get risk “wrong”
or ways in which individuals’ biases may be manifest in their identification of risks
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Certain Activities and Construction of a Road (separate opinion of Dugard, J.), supra note 34, at ¶ 34
(“The fact-finding of the Court cannot be substantiated. To make matters worse the decision of the
Court cannot be reconciled either with the reasoning on the obligation to conduct an environmental
impact assessment employed by the Court in Construction of a Road or with the rules relating to
environmental impact assessments expounded by the Court.”); see also DEVANEY, supra note 256, at
27 (“A number of commentators have argued that the Court has traditionally employed a number
of different tactics in order to avoid engaging with complex factual and scientific determinations.”);
Schiettekatte, supra note 257, at 8.
Diane Desierto, Evidence but not Empiricism? Environmental Impact Assessments at the International Court
of Justice in Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)
and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), EJIL
TALK (Feb. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/F5YN-JW2.
Kersten, supra note 249, at 187.
KULESZA, supra note 29, at 73.
Bodansky, supra note 240, at 621 (“Assessing risk is a scientific task, but determining what to do in
response requires value judgments about what levels of risk are acceptable.”). Cf. Tara Parker-Pope,
Wrong About Risk? Blame Your Brain, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2008), https://perma.cc/ZCT4-Q53G.
See FOSTER, supra note 129, at 257.
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to evaluate.267 This suggests that the possibility that states will increasingly disagree
regarding what risk-based law is telling them to do—at least to the extent it is
substantive and not only procedural. Moreover, it even suggests that states could
invoke risk to overreact to particular phenomena.

VI. C ONCLUSION
In this Article, I have sought to show that risk-based law is on the rise. It has
enormous potential to help frame solutions to today’s most difficult problems.
That said, there are significant enough differences in the way risk analysis is
formulated outside the environmental law area that much work remains to be
done if the trend I have identified is truly to bear fruit. This is not just a matter of
selecting the right tool from the tool set I have sought to depict—obligation
versus authorization, substantive versus procedural, contextual versus categorical.
It is also a more specific question about how to construct the risk-based rule.
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This includes whether individuals can bring an example of the forecast harm to mind (the availability
heuristic), what Cass Sunstein calls probability neglect (overestimation of a harm because of how
awful it would be if it materialized), see Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases and
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 63 (2002), and loss aversion. See also Kahan et al., supra note 26, at 1077–78;
Analysis, in UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 10, at 112–13.
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